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THE FOOD WE EAT AND THE PEOPLE WHO 
FEED US 
STEPHEN LEE 
ABSTRACT 
Food justice scholars and advocates have made a simple but important 
point: for all the attention we pay to the food we eat, we pay far too little 
attention to the people who feed us. But can law play a role in directing 
consumer attention to labor-related issues? Traditional food law paradigms 
provide at best incidental benefits to food workers because these types of 
laws typically rely on transparency and disclosure schemes that serve 
narrow consumer-centric interests. An increasing number of laws attempt 
to disseminate information about the working conditions of the people who 
pick, process, and produce our food so that consumers can also consider 
the ethical and moral consequences of their food choices. In assessing this 
attempt to rebrand labor enforcement in consumer protection terms, this 
Article does two things. First, this Article identifies the conditions under 
which such schemes are most likely to succeed. Regulators should target 
food markets characterized by relative consumer wealth, norm consensus 
regarding which outcomes are desirable, and an established intermediation 
infrastructure to give disclosure laws the best chances for improving labor 
conditions along the food chain. Even where these conditions exist, a second 
point this Article makes is that disclosure laws should supplement, not 
supplant, traditional labor enforcement strategies that rely on worker-
initiated complaints. This is because certain values, like autonomy, equity, 
and community standing are best vindicated by the workers themselves 
instead of by others (like consumers) on their behalf. Crowding out workers 
from the enforcement process creates the risk of exacerbating the structural 
forms of inequality that define work across the food system.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The field of food law has begun to take shape. Over the last several years, 
academic conferences,1 journal issues,2 and even popular entertainment3 
have tackled the subject. Of course, the subject of food has long interested 
legal scholars, but previous efforts to scrutinize food’s place in the law 
focused narrowly on issues specific to well-established fields such as 
agriculture or food safety.4 By contrast, recent efforts have tried to place 
food within the context of a larger regulatory system of which agriculture 
and safety laws comprise only a part.5 This new body of work aims to 
provide a clearer and more comprehensive picture of how our food system 
affects the lives of everyday consumers. Focused on organic food, 
locavorism,6 and sustainable food practices, these scholars and advocates 
have tried to draw our attention to a wide range of moral issues implicated 
by our food choices.7 
Meanwhile, another persistent group of scholars and advocates has 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., 2nd Annual Harvard Law School-UCLA Food Law and Policy Conference: Drugs, 
Animals, and Food: Law & Policy of Antibiotics in the Food System, UCLA L., https://law.ucla.edu/ 
centers/social-policy/resnick-program-for-food-law-and-policy/events/2103/2015/10/23/2nd-Annual-
Harvard-Law-School-UCLA-Food-Law-and-Policy-Conference-c--Drugs-Animals-and-Food-c--Law-
-a--Policy-of-Antibiotics-in-the-Food-System/ [https://perma.cc/569T-9PAQ] (last visited Nov. 27, 
2016) (describing a conference at Harvard Law School on October 23, 2015); 4th Ann. Yale Food 
Systems Symposium, http://yalefoodsymposium.org/ [https://perma.cc/ZBU9-EMXC] (last visited Nov. 
27, 2016) (describing a conference at Yale University on September 30, 2016); Establishing Equity in 
our Food System, U. CAL., IRVINE SCH. L., http://www.law.uci.edu/events/food-equity/2016/ 
[https://perma.cc/59TA-LERL] (last visited Nov. 27, 2016) (describing a conference at UC Irvine on 
March 11–12, 2016). In addition, the University of California has rolled out a Global Food Initiative, 
which provides support for projects that develop solutions for “food security, health, and sustainability.” 
Global Food Initiative, U. CAL.: OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, http://www.ucop.edu/global-food-initiative/ 
[https://perma.cc/2VBH-Z8XQ] (last visited Nov. 27, 2016). 
 2. See, e.g., Symposium, Labor in the Food System, from Farm to Table, 6 J. AGRIC., FOOD SYS., 
& COMMUNITY DEV. 1 (2015), http://www.agdevjournal.com/volume-6-issue-2.html.  
 3. See Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Food Waste (HBO television broadcast July 19, 
2015), http://www.hbo.com/last-week-tonight-with-john-oliver/episodes/02/45-july-19-2015/video/ep-
45-clip-food-waste.html.  
 4. For an early contribution in the field of law and agriculture, see Harold W. Hannah, Law and 
Agriculture, 32 VA. L. REV. 781 (1946). For some early examinations of food safety issues, see C.C. 
Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs Legislation, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1933) and 
Lauffer T. Hayes & Frank J. Ruff, The Administration of the Federal Food and Drugs Act, 1 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 16 (1933). 
 5. See Stephanie Tai, Food Systems Law from Farm to Fork and Beyond, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 
109, 112 (2015). 
 6. See MARGARET GRAY, LABOR AND THE LOCAVORE: THE MAKING OF A COMPREHENSIVE 
FOOD ETHIC (2013). 
 7. See Laura T. Raynolds, Re-embedding Global Agriculture: The International Organic and 
Fair Trade Movements, 17 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 297 (2000); Dawn Thilmany, Craig A. Bond, & 
Jennifer K. Bond, Going Local: Exploring Consumer Behavior and Motivations for Direct Food 
Purchases, 90 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1303 (2008). 
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articulated a simple and often overlooked point: for all the attention we pay 
to food, we pay far too little attention to the people who feed us.8 With a 
focus on the conditions of food production, these commentators have sought 
to crystallize the moral consequences of supporting a food system in which 
workers must contend with daily exploitation. Account after account shows 
that wage theft, sexual harassment, and racial segregation pervade kitchens, 
farms, and meat processing plants all around the country.9 The case for 
expanding notions of food justice to account for both the content of food 
and the conditions of food workers reminds us that concepts of “good food” 
are as much a matter of social construction as they are of nutritional science. 
Imploring the dining public to care about both the food it eats and the people 
who feed it evokes anthropologist Sidney Mintz’s insight that “[g]ood food 
. . . must be good to think about before it becomes good to eat.”10  
Can law play a role in directing consumer attention to the labor 
consequences of their food choices? While not yet pervasive, an increasing 
number of laws disseminate information about the working conditions of 
the people who pick, process, and produce the food products consumers 
buy. Whereas conventional food law frameworks—such as those focused 
on consumer health and safety or those designed to deter anti-competitive 
behavior in the market—create only indirect and incidental benefits to food 
workers, these new laws squarely address and highlight the labor, 
 
 
 8. See Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 
1879 (2007); Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 891 
(2008); Saru Jayaraman, From Triangle Shirtwaist to Windows on the World: Restaurants as the New 
Sweatshops, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 625 (2011); Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave 
Organizing: Creative Campaign Strategies of the Los Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
465 (2005); Mark Bittman, The 20 Million, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (June 12, 2012, 9:00 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/12/the-20-million/; Sustainability in the Workplace: A 
New Approach for Advancing Worker Safety and Health, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 2016), https://www.osha.gov/sustainability/docs/OSHA_ 
sustainability_paper.pdf [hereinafter Sustainability in the Workplace]. 
 9. For accounts of restaurant workers, see REST. OPPORTUNITIES CTR. OF N.Y. & N.Y.C. REST. 
INDUS. COAL., DINING OUT, DINING HEALTHY: THE LINK BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH AND WORKING 
CONDITIONS IN NEW YORK CITY’S RESTAURANT INDUSTRY (2006). For an account of the meat 
processing industry, see Charlotte S. Alexander, Explaining Peripheral Labor: A Poultry Industry Case 
Study, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 353 (2012) and William Kandel & Emilio A. Parrado, 
Restructuring of the US Meat Processing Industry and New Hispanic Migrant Destinations, 31 
POPULATION & DEV. REV. 447 (2005). For an account of farm workers, see MARGARET GRAY, LABOR 
AND THE LOCAVORE: THE MAKING OF A COMPREHENSIVE FOOD ETHIC (2014); SETH M. HOLMES, 
FRESH FRUIT, BROKEN BODIES: MIGRANT FARMWORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES (2013); and 
Guadalupe T. Luna, The Dominion of Agricultural Sustainability: Invisible Farm Laborers, 2014 WIS. 
L. REV. 265 (2014). For a general overview, see FOOD CHAIN WORKERS ALLIANCE, THE HANDS THAT 
FEED US: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR WORKERS ALONG THE FOOD CHAIN (2012). 
 10. SIDNEY W. MINTZ, SWEETNESS AND POWER: THE PLACE OF SUGAR IN MODERN HISTORY 8 
(1985).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/7
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employment, and human rights violations embedded within our food system 
and tied to the choices consumers make. In short, labor enforcement has 
been rebranded in consumer protection terms.  
This Article hopes to do two things. First, it identifies conditions under 
which labor-oriented consumer laws are most likely to succeed. Consumers 
make food choices for a variety of reasons including cost, health, religious 
belief, and convenience. The limited empirical evidence to date suggests 
that food products and services highlighting labor conditions are most likely 
to positively impact consumer choices in food markets characterized by 
relative consumer wealth, norm consensus regarding which outcomes are 
desirable, and an established intermediation infrastructure. Even where 
transparency laws can help leverage consumer dollars to advance labor 
justice goals, a second point this Article makes is that these laws should 
supplement not supplant traditional labor enforcement strategies that rely 
on worker-initiated complaints. Certain values like autonomy, equity, and 
community standing are best vindicated by workers themselves instead of 
by others (like consumers) on their behalf. Crowding out workers from the 
enforcement process creates the risk of exacerbating structural forms of 
inequality that defines work across the food system. 
Part I summarizes how traditional food law paradigms have addressed 
labor injustice and supply chain exploitation. Here, I observe that dominant 
food law paradigms often treat worker exploitation as an afterthought, 
choosing instead to focus on how a bad actor’s conduct impacts its 
consumers or competitors. Food laws have been particularly focused on 
securing the health and safety of consumers. As a result, those approaches 
to food regulation have created limited, and sometimes awkward, 
opportunities to disrupt and deter workplace exploitation. Using these laws 
a foil, Part II explains that a relatively recent set of laws have tried to train 
the public’s attention on harms related to worker exploitation. Drawing 
from public law enforcement models developed in the anti-trafficking and 
labor inspection contexts, these laws enlist the help of consumers to penalize 
food producers that engage in or benefit from exploitation.  
Part III identifies the conditions that will give transparency schemes the 
best chance for success. Three conditions are particularly relevant. One is 
that there must be a sufficiently wealthy and interested consumer base that 
can afford premiums that are typically priced into these ethically produced 
goods. The limited empirical evidence suggests that markets for these types 
of goods exist but cater primarily to middle-class consumers and those with 
relative wealth. Many shoppers may be interested in purchasing ethically 
made goods (or avoiding ethically-compromised goods) but are simply 
priced out of the market. A second condition is a relative consensus on the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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kind of relief to which workers are entitled. In other words, a preponderance 
of consumers must believe that what workers are experiencing does in fact 
amount to exploitation. As I explain, one complicating factor is when 
workplace exploitation implicates unauthorized immigrants, a topic over 
which the public remains sharply divided. A final condition for successful 
market-based governance is an established intermediation infrastructure. 
Information can be confusing and hard to access for consumers. Third-party 
intermediaries play an important role in collecting this information and in 
making it available in a usable form.  
While enlisting the help of consumers to enforce labor laws offers some 
attractive benefits—especially its gap-filling function—Part IV makes the 
case that such laws should proliferate, but only as supplements rather than 
as substitutes for traditional worker-initiated labor enforcement schemes. In 
particular, I point to three values—autonomy, equity, and community 
standing—that are best realized when workers, and not consumers, initiate 
and guide the terms of enforcement.  
I. FOOD WORK AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT 
A core principle animating our nation’s food laws is that consumers 
should be able to make food choices that are safe, healthful, and based on 
accurate information. On this consumer-centric approach, food law scholar 
Lisa Heinzerling observes, “when it comes to food, the American consumer 
must be the best-informed consumer (of any kind) in the world, perhaps in 
the history of the world.”11 As this Part shows, making consumers the 
central focus of our food law system has created only limited and indirect 
opportunities for addressing worker exploitation. 
A. Consumer Safety and Health 
Many food laws help ensure that consumers get what they expect. These 
laws regulate the type of information food producers may disseminate about 
their products. This regulatory approach explains why, for example, meat 
processors have to be careful about advertising their frankfurters as “all 
meat” when they are made just mostly of meat.12 By targeting foods that are 
 
 
 11. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Varieties and Limits of Transparency in U.S. Food Law, 70 FOOD 
& DRUG L.J. 11, 14 (2015). At the same time, she argues that the administrative structure in which these 
laws operate often allows corporate food producers and the outsized influence they wield to distort 
protections, leaving a system that “fails to deliver the transparency it seems to promise.” Id. 
 12. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, for example, renders a food label “misbranded” 
where, among other things, “its labeling is false or misleading in any particular.” 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/7
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“misbranded,” these laws express the view “that the consumer should know 
that an article purchased was what it purported to be; that it might be bought 
for what it really was and not upon misrepresentations as to character and 
quality.”13  
This consumer protection approach reflects a norm of consumers as 
citizens,14 economic actors who have the right to know exactly what they 
are buying. As President Kennedy declared in 1962: “The federal 
Government—by nature the highest spokesman for all the people—has a 
special obligation to be alert to the consumer’s needs and to advance the 
consumer’s interests” and “to make certain that our Nation’s economy fairly 
and adequately serves consumers’ interests.”15 Food laws, then, bolster 
consumer confidence by prohibiting food producers from peddling half-
truths. In United States v. Ninety-Five Barrels (More or Less) Alleged Apple 
Cider Vinegar, for example, federal officials condemned barrels of apple 
cider made from dried or evaporated apples rather than from fresh apples.16 
Upholding the condemnation, the Court explained that the technical truth of 
the product’s label did not change the fact that food manufacturers exploited 
their superior knowledge to detriment of the consumer public.  
These early food laws also helped to allay economic security concerns. 
During the early part of the twentieth century, arguments against 
misbranding were often motivated by concerns with the rising price of food. 
Women, who at the time performed the bulk of food shopping and meal 
preparation duties in the early part of the twentieth-century, figured 
especially prominently into this consumer revolt.17 At the legislative level, 
 
 
(2016). See also Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 607(d) (prohibiting “false” and “misleading” 
labels in relation to meat products subject to the Federal Meat Inspection Act); Fed’n of Homemakers 
v. Butz, 466 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 13. US v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409 (1914). 
 14. Lizabeth Cohen notes the following about America’s mid-twentieth century economic 
expansion: “As a mass consumption-driven economy made possible a more adequate standard of living 
for more people than ever before in the decades after World War II, the consumer in the economic realm 
became increasingly identified with the citizen in the political realm.” See Lizabeth Cohen, The New 
Deal State and the Making of Citizen Consumers, in GETTING AND SPENDING: EUROPEAN AND 
AMERICAN CONSUMER SOCIETIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 111, 111 (Susan Strasser et al. eds., 
1998).  
 15. See Special Message from President John F. Kennedy to the Cong., Protecting the Consumer 
Interest (Mar. 15, 1962), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9108 [https://perma.cc/ 
F3Z5-5XQ3]. Later on in the decade, President Nixon echoed these sentiments, noting that “[t]he buyer 
has the right to register his dissatisfaction, and have his complaint heard and weighed, when his interests 
are badly served.” See Special Message from President Richard Nixon to the Cong., Consumer 
Protection (Oct. 30, 1969), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2299 [https://perma. cc/7BHW-
YQT4]. 
 16. 265 U.S. 438, 439 (1924). 
 17. See Monroe Friedman, American Consumer Boycotts in Response to Rising Food Prices: 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Congress passed the McNary-Mapes Amendment—called the “Canner’s 
Amendment”—which authorized the FDA to apply its “standard of quality” 
and “fill of container” requirements to canned food goods.18 Getting one’s 
money’s worth was not only a matter of fairness and dignity. During 
uncertain economic times, like the Great Depression, it was a matter of 
keeping at bay hunger and a sense of pessimism. As one government-
sponsored radio talk show declared in sharp, albeit outdated, terms: “We 
housewives need to be more discriminating than ever as label-readers if we 
want to get our money’s worth in canned goods.”1920 
Food laws also empower consumers to make more healthful food 
choices. The early strand of food laws, like the Pure Food and Drug Act,  
sought to protect consumers from themselves. As one court put it, these laws 
sought to protect even “the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.21 
Over the course of the twentieth century, food law has become less 
interventionist in this regard—that is, regulators are less willing to protect 
consumers against their own irrational decisions—but the law still fixates 
on the disclosure of information relevant to making these choices. In 2002, 
the FDA issued a guidance document explaining that it planned to pursue 
misbranding claims not under the highly protective “unthinking” consumer 
standard but rather with “reasonable” consumers in mind.22 Such a view, the 
FDA explained, “more accurately reflects FDA’s belief that consumers are 
active partners in their own health care who behave in health-promoting 
ways when they are given accurate health information.”23  
Other modern examples similarly reflect a policy of empowering 
consumers to make healthful food choices through disclosure requirements. 
Perhaps the most obvious example is the nutritional label affixed to nearly 
all food items available in grocery stores that reveals an item’s nutrition-
 
 
Housewives’ Protests at the Grassroots Level, 18 Journal of Consumer Policy 55 (1995); William 
Frieburger, War Prosperity and Hunger: The New York Food Riots of 1917, 25 Labor History 217 
(1984). 
 18. Id. However, it excluded meat and milk products. Id. 
 19. Housekeepers’ Chat (U.S. Dep’t of Agric. radio broadcast Oct. 4, 1937), transcript available 
at https://archive.org/stream/labelrequirement1937unit#page/n1/mode/2up. 
 20. Id. at 442–43. 
 21. The early strand of food laws like the PFDA sought to protect consumers from themselves. As 
one court put it, these laws sought to protect even “the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous. “See 
United States v. An Article . . . Consisting of 216 Individually Cartoned Bottles, 409 F.2d 734, 740 (2d 
Cir. 1969) (quoting Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910)).  
 22. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: QUALIFIED HEALTH CLAIMS IN 
THE LABELING OF CONVENTIONAL FOODS AND DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS (2002), http://www.fda.gov/ 
ohrms/dockets/98fr/guidance[1].html. 
 23. See id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/7
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related contents.24 Without such labels, consumers would be unable to 
screen food products for ingredients connected to negative health outcomes 
such as sugars and saturated fats. More recently, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act includes a provision requiring chain restaurants to 
disclose the caloric content of the food products on their menus.25 Giving 
consumers this data helps them make healthier food choices, thereby 
reducing the costs of healthcare in the long run.26 And at the sub-federal 
level, many jurisdictions require restaurants to display health grades as a 
way to reduce the number of food-borne illnesses.27  
All of these disclosure obligations are designed to help consumers do 
what is in their best interests and to enable them to independently monitor 
their own health.28 This deeply pragmatic regulatory approach, which 
studiously weighs costs against benefits, tends to avoid the forced disclosure 
of information that could serve thornier or more potentially divisive policy 
goals designed to express moral judgment or outrage.29 By and large, the 
 
 
 24. The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act requires the disclosure of information about content 
such as sugar, calories, and saturated fat to deter problems related to obesity, diabetes, and heart disease. 
See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2012). See also David A. Kessler, Toward More Comprehensive Food Labeling, 
371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 193 (2014). In 2004, Congress passed the Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer 
Protection Act, which requires food manufacturers to disclose whether a particular food product contains 
one of several known food allergens. See Pub. L. No. 108-282, § 203, 118 Stat. 905, 906–08 (codified 
at 21 U.S.C. § 343). See also Sarah Besnoff, Comment, May Contain: Allergen Labeling Regulations, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1465 (2014).  
 25. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 4205, 124 Stat. 119, 573–
76 (2010); Department of Health and Human Services, Food Labeling: Nutrition Labeling of Standard 
Menu Items in Restaurants and Similar Retail Food Establishments, 79 Fed. Reg. 71156 (Dec. 1, 2014). 
See generally Christine Cusick, Menu-Labeling Laws: A Move from Local to National Regulation, 51 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 989 (2011). 
 26. Christine Cusick, Menu-Labeling Laws: A Move from Local to National Regulation, 51 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 989, 990 (2011). 
 27. Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE 
L.J. 574 (2012); David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155 (2006). 
 28. As Lewis Grossman explains, it is often the case that, in the food regulation context, the 
consumer is assumed to be “an intelligent manager of his or her own health who does not need to be 
shielded from accurate information.” Lewis A. Grossman, FDA and the Rise of the Empowered 
Consumer, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 627, 644 (2014).  
 29. Laws like the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Federal Meat Inspection Act that 
reside at the heart of our federal food laws aim to ensure the safety and quality of the food that is sold in 
grocery stores around our country. To the extent these laws do account for abuse, they do so in terms of 
how animals are transported and slaughtered, not in terms of the workers doing the transporting and 
slaughtering. See 21 U.S.C. § 603(b) (2012) (mandating that the Agriculture Secretary create an 
examination and inspection system “[f]or the purpose of preventing the inhumane slaughtering of 
livestock”); 9 C.F.R. § 313.2(b)–(c) (2016) (limiting the use of certain instruments like electric prods, 
pipes and “sharp or pointed objects” in driving animals); id. § 313.1(c) (requiring that slaughter facilities 
provide for “dying, diseased, and disabled livestock” with shelter against adverse weather conditions 
while they await slaughter). See also Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 973–74 (2012) (noting 
that the Federal Meat Inspection Act accounts for animal abuse). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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goal of these laws is to foster and respect consumer autonomy,30 not to 
proselytize or to strong-arm consumers into a particular lifestyle.31  
This focus on consumer interests—on health, safety, and autonomy—
has severely constrained the kinds of claims worker rights advocates and 
officials can advance. Many of these attempts to leverage consumer 
protection schemes for labor enforcement purposes can feel awkward, 
forced, or overly narrow. Consider some of the labor advocacy campaigns 
waged by the Restaurant Opportunities Center (ROC), which among other 
things tries to organize restaurant workers. In service of this goal, ROC 
issues a number of eating guides that focus on employers who refuse to 
provide sick days to their employees, with the obvious implication that 
forcing ill food workers to prepare and serve food raises the risk of 
consumers contracting a food-borne illness.32 For example, a 2006 report 
compared restaurants that offered paid sick days with those that didn’t and 
found that workers in restaurants without paid sick days were more likely 
to work while sick or injured, more likely to work while sneezing and 
coughing, more likely to spit on food, and less likely to seek medical care 
due to an on-the-job injury than workers in restaurants with paid sick 
leave.33 And the report also found that workers that had not received proper 
health and safety training were more likely to have handled food improperly 
or served spoiled or leftover food to customers than workers who had 
received such training.34 Both of these findings and others like it are 
intuitive, and more to the point, they are notable because they link the 
public’s interest in safe food to labor’s interest in safe working conditions. 
Thus, ROC has begun targeting workplaces with “employment conditions 
that compel workers to do things that might harm consumer health and 
safety, such as having to work while sick or not receiving proper health and 
 
 
 30. Or, as Mark McKenna has observed about consumers in the advertising context, defending 
consumer autonomy “does not depend on a descriptive claim that consumers will generally make good 
decisions. It depends instead on the judgment that due regard for consumer autonomy requires us to live 
with these decisions even if they are bad.” Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of 
Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67, 120 (2012). 
 31. See Lewis A. Grossman, The Origins of American Health Libertarianism, 13 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 76 (2013). 
 32. See, e.g., REST. OPPORTUNITIES CTRS. UNITED, 2013 ROC NATIONAL DINERS’ GUIDE TO 
ETHICAL EATING (2012), http://rocunited.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/ROC-DINERS-GUIDE-
2013.pdf [hereinafter 2013 ROC DINERS’ GUIDE]. A 2006 report pressed the point that a restaurant that 
is more likely to ignore basic workplace protections like the minimum wage or overtime pay is also 
likely to foster food preparation practices that pose a threat to public health. See REST. OPPORTUNITIES 
CTR. OF N.Y. & N.Y.C. REST. INDUS. COAL., supra note 9. 
 33. Id. at 11. 
 34. See id. at 5.  
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safety training.”35 
A diner who is concerned with her personal health may understandably 
avoid a restaurant where an employer has no sick day policy. Learning that 
a particular business engages in risky behavior simplifies the 
decisionmaking process for consumers choosing among otherwise 
comparable dining options. At the same time, that consumer might have no 
objection to dining at an establishment with a track record of other labor 
violations that do not directly impact one’s health. Wage theft, for example, 
does not directly affect the safety of food. Neither does racial segregation 
or sexual harassment or even arguably the denial of meal and rest breaks. 
Moreover, paid sick leave is not required under federal law. And while 
penalizing restaurants for forcing workers to work through illness is 
consistent with the spirit of federal labor law’s anti-exploitation mandate, 
this example illustrates the limits of linking labor enforcement arguments to 
consumer health rationales.  
Farming practices offer another instance in which consumer health 
frames have only awkwardly bolstered worker protections. Take, for 
example, the organic certification process. This third-party certification 
system encourages farmers to adopt sustainable practices that minimize the 
environmental impact of agricultural food production as well as minimize 
the introduction of pesticides into consumer diets.36 Such farming practices 
also generate benefits that redound to workers. For obvious reasons, 
banning the use of chemical pesticides also decreases workplace dangers.37 
 
 
 35. See REST. OPPORTUNITIES CTRS. UNITED, SERVING WHILE SICK: HIGH RISKS & LOW 
BENEFITS FOR THE NATION’S RESTAURANT WORKFORCE, AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE CONSUMER 1 
(2010), http://rocunited.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/reports_serving-while-sick_full.pdf. See also 
2013 ROC DINERS’ GUIDE, supra note 32 . This strategy of harnessing consumers as allies enjoys a long 
history. The National Consumers’ League (NCL) was a powerful lobbying group that was organized by 
middle class consumers. The NCL played a central role in advancing the cause of many basic protections 
like child labor laws and the minimum wage. It also advanced an anti-sweatshop campaign during the 
1890s. Importantly, the campaign sidelined the ethical implications of purchasing and consuming 
products from sweatshop factories and focused instead on the public health concerns. By highlighting 
the “disease-ridden tenements” producing garments, the NCL was able to tap into public anxiety over 
“import[ing] smallpox, diphtheria, or other diseases into their homes.” Kathryn Kish Skylar, The 
Consumers’ White Label Campaign of the National Consumers’ League, 1898–1918, in GETTING AND 
SPENDING: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN CONSUMER SOCIETIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 17, 18–19 
(Susan Strasser et al. eds., 1998). The NCL sought to empower women through consumption, which was 
vital given their exclusion from the franchise. See LAWRENCE GLICKMAN, BUYING POWER: A HISTORY 
OF CONSUMER ACTIVISM IN AMERICA 207 (2009). Importantly, this framework envisioned consumers 
as having responsibilities. See id. See also Frank Trentmann, Beyond Consumerism: New Historical 
Perspectives on Consumption, 39 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 373, 383 (2004). 
 36. See Patricia Allen & Martin Kovach, The Capitalist Composition of Organic: The Potential of 
Markets in Fulfilling the Promise of Organic Agriculture, 17 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 221 (2000).  
 37. See Daniel Jaffee & Philip H. Howard, Corporate Cooptation of Organic and Fair Trade 
Standards, 27 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 387 (2009). 
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But these worker benefits are rarely advanced as a core justification for 
farmers to embrace organic farming practices.38 The organic farming lobby 
famously opposed a California bill that would have banned hand weeding 
farming practices.39 Overlooking the debilitating back injuries linked to 
these farming practices, many small farm owners opposed the bill because 
such a law, they argued, would give large-scale, nonorganic farms a 
competitive advantage over smaller, organic farms.40 Thus, even though 
concepts of sustainability are usually flexible enough to account for worker 
safety concerns,41 the reality has been that organized and powerful interest 
groups have been able to coopt labels like “organic” to work against 
farmworker interests. 
All of this means that because sustainable food systems generally offer 
no guarantees on worker safety,42 consumers can never assume with full 
confidence that buying foods affixed with the “organic” label translates into 
support for the workers themselves. As food scholars Sandy Brown and 
Christy Getz observe, this model of enforcement fits within a “trickle down” 
notion of food justice in which “third party schemes seem to want to fix 
labor practices on behalf of workers without including them.”43 My point 
here is that in many cases, worker benefits emerge as an afterthought to 
other benefits that more directly benefit consumers. 
B. Anti-Competition 
Another common food law framework is grounded in principles of anti-
competition. This too has offered protection to workers only indirectly. 
Such a framework is most closely associated with our nation’s antitrust legal 
framework, which attempts to deter firms from gaining unfair competitive 
advantages in the civil and criminal settings. Recently, the anti-competitive 
framework made an appearance in a food labeling case. The FDA’s 
regulation of pomegranate juice allows for companies to advertise 
 
 
 38. See Aimee Shreck, Christy Getz, & Gail Feenstra, Social Sustainability, Farm Labor, and 
Organic Agriculture: Findings from an Exploratory Analysis, 23 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 439, 440 
(2006).  
 39. See Christy Getz, Sandy Brown, & Aimee Shreck, Class Politics and Agricultural 
Exceptionalism in California’s Organic Agriculture Movement, 36 POL. & SOC’Y 478, 479 (2008). 
 40. See id at 492. 
 41. See Sustainability in the Workplace: A New Approach for Advancing Worker Safety and 
Health, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 2016), https://www.osha.gov/ 
sustainability/docs/OSHA_sustainability_paper.pdf. 
 42. See Joann Lo, Social Justice for Food Workers in a Foodie World, 3 J. OF CRITICAL THOUGHT 
& PRAXIS 1, 18 (2014). 
 43. See id. at 1190, 1192.  
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beverages as “pomegranate juice” even when the food product is more than 
98% apple and grape juice, as was the case with Coca-Cola’s “pomegranate 
blueberry” juice.44 Pom Wonderful, which sells beverages that are 100% 
pomegranate juice, brought an antitrust suit against the Coca-Cola Company 
alleging economic harms in the form of lost business on account of Coca-
Cola’s allegedly deceptive practices.45  
In Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., the Court addressed whether 
engaging in a labeling practice that was explicitly sanctioned by the FDA 
under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) would immunize 
that food producer from a civil suit by a competitor for a violation of the 
Lanham Act, the key federal antirust statute.46 Put differently, Coca-Cola 
argued that because Congress intended for food and beverage labels to be 
governed by national uniform standards, the Lanham Act should yield to the 
FDCA. The Court rejected this argument. Explaining that the two statutes 
served complementary, but not identical, purposes, the Court concluded that 
complying with FDA regulations did not necessarily by extension satisfy 
the requirements of the Lanham Act.47 The larger point, however, is that 
while the enforcement of these laws certainly benefits consumers by 
ensuring that they receive accurate information about the food products they 
buy, the interests that the Court ultimately vindicated belonged to Coca-
Cola’s competitors.48 Protections enjoyed by the public are incidental to the 
protections offered to a bad actor’s competitors.  
The Tariff Act of 193049 illustrates how anti-competition principles 
could operate to provide incidental benefit to workers. In the early part of 
the twentieth century, the desire of American officials to partake in global 
commerce and trade raised uncomfortable questions about what to do about 
goods—including food items such as coffee and cocoa—imported from 
foreign markets where no prohibitions against slavery existed. President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal protections famously excluded farm 
workers and domestic workers to appease Southern Democrats interested in 
maintaining a pliable, exploitable, and large African American workforce, 
but Americans could at least point to the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
 
 
 44. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2014). 
 45. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 2240. 
 48. See id. at 2234 (noting that the Lanham Act protects competitors who experience “an injury to 
a commercial interest in sales or business reputation proximately cause by [a] defendant’s 
misrepresentations.” (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 
1395 (2014))). 
 49. 19 U.S.C. § 1202 et seq. (2012). 
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abolishment of slavery as a sign of a legal culture dedicated to anti-
exploitation norms.50 At the same time, the country was reeling from the 
Great Depression, placing considerable pressure on elected officials to help 
restore the economy and stymie the impacts of joblessness and economic 
insecurity. 
Elected officials resolved this tension with the Tariff Act of 1930, which 
prohibited the importation of any goods that were produced “by convict 
labor or/and forced labor or/and indentured labor under penal sanctions.”51 
This law emanated at least in part from a broader set of moral commitments 
to dignity and anti-exploitation and other values expressed by a free and 
healthy workforce.52 But a larger concern was with correcting the 
competitive disadvantage experienced by domestic firms, who were subject 
to the Thirteenth Amendment and other domestic labor protections.53  
For decades, the protections offered by the Tariff Act to foreign food 
workers were not only incidental, but were often imaginary. This is because 
in trying to balance the interests of industry in earning profit against the 
interests of the public in obtaining cheap goods, Congress placed a thumb 
on the scale in favor of the consuming public. Slave-made goods were 
banned from importation except where such goods were not domestically 
produced in sufficient quantities to meet “consumptive demands.”54 Take 
the cocoa industry, for example. Even proof that cocoa beans were 
harvested by slaves—children in most cases—in West Africa was not 
enough to prevent consumers from getting their hands on imported food 
 
 
 50. See Juan F. Perea, The Echoes of Slavery: Recognizing the Racist Origins of the Agricultural 
and Domestic Worker Exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (2011); 
Sean Farhang & Ira Katznelson, The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New Deal and 
Fair Deal, 19 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 1 (2005); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal 
Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 51–85 (1999). 
 51. 19 U.S.C. § 1307. The statute was eventually amended to add goods produced by “child labor” 
to the list of prohibited categories of goods. Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200 
§ 411(a), 114 Stat. 298 (2000).  
 52. As one commentator observed, Senator John Blaine, who championed the bill through 
Congress, “blended economic protectionism of domestic producers with moral indignation over the 
poverty, degeneration, and inhuman treatment suffered by natives in what would today be described as 
the Third World.” Christopher S. Armstrong, American Import Controls and Morality in International 
Trade: An Analysis of Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 8 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 19, 23 (1975). 
 53. See McKinney v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 799 F.2d 1544, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Section 
307 was enacted by Congress to protect domestic producers, production, and workers from the unfair 
competition which would result from the importation of foreign products produced by forced labor.”). 
See also Mark K. Neville, Jr., Child Labor—A Modest Proposal, 20 J. INT’L TAX’N 18, 19 (2009). 
 54. 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (“[I]n no case shall [the forced labor provisions] be applicable to goods, 
wares, articles, or merchandise so mined, produced, or manufactured which are not mined, produced, or 
manufactured in such quantities in the United States as to meet the consumptive demands of the United 
States.”).   
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items.55 Almost 21 million people are enslaved for profit worldwide, 
generating $150 billion in illicit revenue.56 And while the overall point of 
the Tariff Act was to punish foreign companies selling slave-made foods at 
artificially low (and morally objectionable) prices, the “consumer demand” 
exemption rendered even these incidental protections ineffective.57 If 
consumers wanted something badly enough, legislators made sure that they 
would get it. 
The loophole was finally closed in 2015.58 So the Tariff Act now 
presents a more effective deterrent to exploitation up the supply chain. But 
the law’s anti-competitive origins remain. And to the extent workers up the 
supply chain experience some relief, it is not because they were able to 
directly affect the process. Even under this more fully realized version of 
the Tariff Act, workers remain an afterthought.  
II. LABOR ENFORCEMENT AS CONSUMER PROTECTION 
The process of making a food choice usually conjures a few images: a 
lonely consumer perusing grocery store aisles, popping in and out of dusty 
bodegas, or perhaps absentmindedly scrolling through Yelp restaurant 
reviews. But these images also create the false impression that food choices 
begin and end with the consumer. By focusing on the individual act of 
purchasing food—reviewing nutritional and menu labels, weighing the 
relative healthfulness and taste of a food product, and calculating how much 
of one’s food budget to spend—these paradigms minimize and obfuscate 
 
 
 55. In 2001, chocolate manufacturing giants Nestle, Mars, and Hershey signed the Engels-Harkin 
protocol and, in doing so, pledged $2 million to investigate the use of child and slave labor up the supply 
chain. For 85 years, the US banned the importation of products made by slave labor except where 
domestic production couldn’t meet consumer demand. Cocoa is being produced in the Ivory Coast in 
West Africa plantations. Those plantations use slave labor. The US could not produce enough cocoa to 
support America’s demand for chocolate. At the time, the world consumed about 3 million tons of 
chocolate. See Joe Sandler Clarke, Child Labour on Nestlé Farms: Chocolate Giant’s Problems 
Continue, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-
professionals-network/2015/sep/02/child-labour-on-nestle-farms-chocolate-giants-problems-continue.  
 56. See Ben Leubsdord, Modern Forms of Slavery Generate $150 Billion a Year in Profits for 
Exploiters, Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2014. For some context, the population of the state of Florida 
is just under 20 million and the state’s international trade industry generates about $150 billion. 
 57. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 58. See Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, 130 Stat. 122 
(2016). Even then, the death of the consumer demand exception drew little attention, at least from public 
officials. To take one example, President Obama’s 616-word signing statement included a single, 
throwaway sentence on the subject of forced labor. “And, [the bill] eliminates a provision that previously 
allowed some imports into the United States made, in whole or in part, with forced labor, including child 
labor.” Barack Obama, Signing Statement for H.R. 644, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 24, 2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/25/signing-statement-hr-644 
[https://perma.cc/87VR-AS4T]. 
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information about a food product’s origins.59 They ignore who produced the 
food and whether the conditions of production proceeded on fair, just, and 
safe terms. In fact, consumption touches upon an intricate web of 
relationships. As sociologist Lisa Sun-Hee Park observes: “[C]onsumption 
is not a solitary act. Consumption is a social relationship.”60  
Over the last several years, a number of laws and regulations have tried 
to expose the social, political, and economic relationships implicated by 
consumer choices. Rather than empowering consumers to make food 
choices advancing their own economic or health goals, these laws try to 
educate consumers about the ethical and moral consequences of their 
choices. One version of these laws stems from a larger effort to combat 
trafficking. Twenty-one million people around the globe work as coerced or 
“forced” labor.61 The sales from goods produced by these workers support 
a variety of industries including food markets, especially agriculture and 
seafood.62 A number of labor and criminal laws protect victims of 
workplace exploitation within the United States, but for obvious reasons, 
such violations are more difficult to remedy and deter when they transpire 
in foreign settings. To compensate for this lack of reach, disclosure and 
transparency schemes in this context operate as supplements to enforcement 
efforts. These laws generate information about a business’s reliance on 
exploitative labor practices with the hope that such disclosures will penalize 
them by shooing customers away. 
The Department of Labor (DOL), for example, publishes and updates a 
list of goods that utilize forced and child labor. In 1999, President Clinton 
issued Executive Order 13,126, which both instructed the DOL to maintain 
a list of goods that were produced through forced or child labor and their 
countries of origin and required federal contractors to demonstrate a good 
faith effort to determine whether their goods were supplied from such 
countries.63 In order to help disrupt the global trafficking industry, Congress 
has required the DOL to publish and update a list of goods that the DOL 
“has reason to believe are produced by forced labor or child labor in 
violation of international standards.”64 Much more than the DOL’s domestic 
 
 
 59. Some of this stems from the libertarian streak that gnaws at even the most pro-regulation 
consumer. See Grossman, supra note 31.  
 60. See LISA SUN-HEE PARK, CONSUMING CITIZENSHIP: CHILDREN OF ASIAN IMMIGRANT 
ENTREPRENEURS 3 (2005). 
 61. See The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act: A Resource Guide (2015). 
 62. See List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor (Dec. 1, 2014).  
 63. See Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor, 
Exec. Order No. 13,126, 64 Fed. Reg. 32383 (1999).  
 64. See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/7
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enforcement efforts, this program embraces a law enforcement rationale that 
identifies victims of trafficking.65 These efforts target a diverse cross-
section of industries of which food industries comprise only a part. Yet, the 
DOL’s anti-trafficking efforts within industries like coffee, cocoa, and 
shrimp inevitably put pressure on the countries that host these food 
producers to respond or else risk losing the revenue streaming in on account 
of these exports.66  
Another example is the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 
(Transparency Act). California imposes disclosure requirements on large 
businesses based in the state.67 In passing the Transparency Act, California 
has tried to capitalize on its outsized influence in the global market as a way 
of deterring such acts up the supply chain. As the California Attorney 
General’s office states: “California, which boasts the world’s seventh-
largest economy and the country’s largest consumer base, is unique in its 
ability to address this issue, and as a result, to help eradicate human 
trafficking and slavery worldwide.”68 Modeled after corporate social 
responsibility schemes, which are voluntary in nature,69 the Transparency 
Act requires companies doing business in California making more than 
$100 million—an estimated 1700 businesses70—to display on their website 
efforts to eradicate trafficking in their supply chain.71 This information must 
be “conspicuous and easily understood” by consumers.72 And the law grants 
the California Attorney General (AG) the exclusive power to enforce the 
Act’s provisions for injunctive relief.73 While the California AG has taken 
 
 
§ 105(b)(1), (b)(2)(C), 119 Stat. 3566–67 (2006); BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF LABOR, 
LIST OF GOODS PRODUCED BY CHILD LABOR OR FORCED LABOR i, https://www.dol.gov/ ilab/reports/ 
pdf/tvpra_report2014.pdf [hereinafter DOL, LIST OF GOODS].  
 65. See DOL, LIST OF GOODS, supra note 64, at 12. 
 66. For example, in its 2014 report, the DOL highlighted the efforts undertaken by Nicaragua, Cote 
d’Ivoire, and Thailand to combat the exploitative work conditions in the coffee, cocoa, and shrimp 
industries respectively. Id. at 11–12, 14.  
 67. The Transparency Act states: “Every retail seller and manufacturer doing business in this state 
and having annual worldwide gross receipts that exceed one hundred million dollars ($100,000,000) 
shall disclose . . . its efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from its direct supply chain for 
tangible goods offered for sale.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.43(a)(1) (West Supp. 2013). 
 68. KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY 
CHAINS ACT: A RESOURCE GUIDE i (2015), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/sb657/ 
resource-guide.pdf.  
 69. See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2005). 
 70. See KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN 
SUPPLY CHAINS ACT: A RESOURCE GUIDE 3 (2015), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ 
sb657/resource-guide.pdf.  
 71. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)–(b). 
 72. Id. at § 1714.43(b).  
 73. See id. at § 1714.43(d).  
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a cautious approach to enforcing these laws,74 it is important to point out 
that the AG still characterizes this law as a part of a larger anti-trafficking 
effort to draw the public’s attention to the moral implications of their 
consumption choices.75  
Beyond the anti-trafficking context, federal regulators have employed 
similar transparency-based schemes to advance domestic labor enforcement 
goals. Consider, for example, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), which oversees federal enforcement of the major 
workplace safety laws. In December 2016, OSHA issued a white paper 
calling for greater leveraging of the sustainability movement and regulatory 
infrastructure to achieve workplace safety goals.76 According to OSHA, 
three pillars support the sustainability framework—environment, economy, 
and society—and of the three, society is the least well understood.77 
Building on the insights of a small number of organizations focused on how 
sustainability issues account for worker safety,78 OSHA seems to be 
leveraging the momentum and market power commanded by sustainability 
actors to advance its goals of workplace safety.79  
 
 
 74. To date, the AG’s office has yet to initiate any prosecutions, opting instead for an educational 
approach to partnering with rather than punishing businesses affected by the disclosure requirements. 
See Rebecca Cross & J. Noah Hagey, A New Class of Calif. Supply Chain Disclosure Suits, LAW360 
(Oct. 27, 2015) http://www.law360.com/articles/718673/a-new-class-of-calif-supply-chain-disclosure-
suits (noting that the California AG had “reportedly sent warning letters to multiple retailers and 
manufacturers”). See also CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, BIENNIAL 
REPORT: MAJOR ACTIVITIES IN 2015-2016 45, https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ 
publications/biennial-2015-2016.pdf (reporting that the AG’s office “has issued extensive educational 
materials to aid companies in complying with the Transparency in Supply Chains Act”). The report 
further notes that the California AG sent letters to more than 1,000 companies in April 2015. See id. 
These letters appear to do no more than simply inform businesses of the reporting requirements imposed 
by the Supply Chains Act. See id. at 10 (reporting that the AG “sent letters to over 1000 companies 
informing them of the requirements of the [Transparency Act]”). 
 75. For example, a recent report highlighted a human trafficking victory in which the AG, working 
as a part of a multi-agency taskforce, charged several defendants with pimping, pandering, bribery, and 
tax fraud. See id.; Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris 
Announces Arrest of Four Suspects Running Emeryville Sex Trafficking Ring (Dec. 12, 2014), 
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-announces-arrest-four-
suspects-running.  
 76. See Sustainability in the Workplace: A New Approach for Advancing Worker Safety and 
Health, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 2016), https://www.osha.gov/ 
sustainability/docs/OSHA_sustainability_paper.pdf. 
 77. See Sustainability in the Workplace: A New Approach for Advancing Worker Safety and 
Health, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 2016), https://www.osha.gov/ 
sustainability/docs/OSHA_sustainability_paper.pdf. 
 78. For example, The Sustainability Consortium has created a “product category portfolio, which 
allows consumers to learn about how worker safety and exploitation concerns fit into larger 
sustainability assessments of products like chicken, beef, or chocolate. See Product Category Portfolio, 
SUSTAINABILITY CONSORTIUM, https://www.sustainabilityconsortium.org/product-categories/.  
 79. Sustainability in the Workplace, supra note 8, at 6 (“Fully articulating and integrating OSH 
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The Department of Labor’s wage and hour division, our nation’s primary 
labor enforcement agency, has also been active in rebranding its labor 
enforcement strategies in consumer protection terms especially in its 
regulation of the restaurant industry. Although labor violations run rampant 
in many low-wage industries—such as caregiving, private security services, 
janitorial work, and landscaping—the restaurant industry stands apart in 
having the benefit of laws that favor transparency and informed decision-
making.80 To help address the exploitation of workers in low-wage 
industries like the restaurant and food service industries, the DOL, under 
the Obama administration, reformed its enforcement policies to maximize 
its limited resources.81  
This reform was part of a larger shift in governance under President 
Obama that embraces principles of openness and transparency and fosters 
data-driven enforcement. Rather than simply presenting massive reams of 
information to the public, the Obama administration tried to disseminate 
information that was intelligible and digestible and that “nudged” them to 
do the right thing (at least as dictated by whatever policy was being 
implemented).82 Harnessing the expertise of the private sector in making 
data more accessible, the Executive made existing regulatory data available 
 
 
within sustainability efforts can help expand the thinking of those already involved in sustainability and 
also provide a platform for OSHA and the community of safety and health professionals to move beyond 
traditional roles. Given the traction and the momentum of the sustainability movement, this type of 
engagement can be used as a transformative force to amplify the impact on the lives of workers, both 
inside and outside the workplace.”). 
 80. For an overview of the various low-wage industries, see ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., NAT’L 
EMP’T LAW PROJECT, BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND 
LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES (2009), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/ 
2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf and WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE AND 
HOUR COLLECTS OVER $1.4 BILLION IN BACK WAGES FOR OVER 2 MILLION EMPLOYEES SINCE FISCAL 
YEAR 2001 (2008), http://www.dol.gov/whd/statistics/2008FiscalYear.pdf. 
 81. See, e.g., Sustainability in the Workplace, supra note 8, at 6. 
 82. Id. at 2. See also RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). In 2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 
13,563, which reaffirmed the cost-benefit analysis of proposed regulations and championed the 
“provision of information to the public in a form that is clear and intelligible.”82 See Press Release, White 
House, President Obama Announces Another Key OMB Post, (Apr. 20, 2009), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-announces-another-key-omb-post. To 
help ensure that this shift in principle translated into reformation of policy, President Obama appointed 
Professor Cass Sunstein as the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. See 
Press Release, White House, President Obama Announces Another Key OMB Post (Apr. 20, 2009), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-announces-another-key-omb-post. An 
expert in behavioral economics, Sunstein encouraged all agencies to create policies and programs that 
simplified people’s choices. Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory 
Affairs, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies, (Sept. 8, 2011), https://www.white 
house.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/informing-consumers-through-smart-disclosure. 
pdf. 
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in a machine-readable format to invite data experts to find ways to translate 
existing data into a digestible format for the public.83 In 2011, the DOL 
Office of Public Affairs responded to the president’s Open and Transparent 
Government Initiative by establishing a public-facing Developer 
Community website “to assist, support, and encourage public entities to 
develop user friendly software applications using DOL datasets.”84  
Importantly, the DOL under President Obama aggressively targeted 
wage theft. In 2011, the Wage and Hour Division collected $225 million in 
back wages, which was the largest amount the DOL had ever collected in a 
single year.85 Unlike the DOL during the Bush administration, which 
evinced some indifference and incompetence regarding wage theft,86 the 
DOL during the Obama administration prioritized the rational enforcement 
 
 
 83. See Exec. Order No. 13,642, 78 Fed. Reg. 28,111 (2013). 
 84. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DIGITAL GOVERNMENT STRATEGY, MILESTONE #1.2 – OPEN DATA 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 2 (2013), https://www.dol.gov/digital-strategy/DigitalGovernance1-2.pdf. 
See also Developer Portal, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (last visited Nov. 12, 2016), http://developer.dol.gov/ 
[https://perma.cc/7NWD-4GUK]. The competitions are funded through the Electronic Government 
Fund. See 44 U.S.C. § 3604(a)(3)(A) (2012) (making funding available for projects that, among other 
things, “make Federal Government information and services more readily available to members of the 
public”). Against this backdrop, the DOL became revitalized during the Obama administration. In terms 
of the President’s data mandate, in 2010, the DOL announced a strategic plan for maintaining agency 
accountability. Rather than focusing on “output measures,” which include data like the number of 
investigations that an agency conducts, the plan announced a “new approach” that would focus on 
“outcome measures,” which look at the effectiveness of a particular strategy. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
A NEW APPROACH TO MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WORKER 
PROTECTION AGENCIES 5 (2010), https://www.dol.gov/ _sec/stratplan/newapproach.pdf [hereinafter, A 
NEW APPROACH]. See also Alison D. Morantz, Putting Data to Work for Workers: The Role of 
Information Technology in U.S. Worker Protection Agencies, 67 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 675, 676 
(2014). This is consistent with President Obama’s broader commitment to transparency and openness in 
government. See Memorandum from Barack Obama, President, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & 
Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009). Evaluating effectiveness would require looking beyond whether a particular 
entity had fallen into line post-inspection. The DOL would examine compliance levels within the larger 
universe of regulated entities—not just those where an inspection had occurred. See A NEW APPROACH, 
at 6. To do this, the DOL will utilize tools of statistical analysis such as random sampling, stratified 
random sampling, and other social science research methods to assess the impact of inspections on an 
industry-wide basis. See id. 
 85. See Examining Regulatory and Enforcement Actions Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 
112th Cong. 8, 11 (2011) (testimony of Nancy J. Leppink, Deputy Administrator, Wage and Hour 
Division, United States Department of Labor).  
 86. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Agency Is Failing Workers, Report Says, NY TIMES (Mar. 24, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/25/washington/25wage.html?_r=0. In 2009, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report documenting the incompetence of the DOL based on an 
audit the GAO conducted within the DOL. The audit period spanned July 2008 to March 2009, which 
caught the first two months of the Obama administration. See Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Dir., Forensic 
Audits & Special Investigations and Jonathan T. Meyer, Assistant Dir., Forensic Audits & Special 
Investigations, Testimony Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor: Wage and Hour Division’s 
Complaint Intake and Investigative Processes Leave Low Wage Workers Vulnerable to Wage Theft 4 
(Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/122107.pdf. 
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of labor laws affecting low wage earners.87 And the DOL tried to change 
case law through the aggressive filing of amicus briefs in Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) cases. Through its first term, the Obama 
administration had filed nearly 100 amicus briefs in cases involving FLSA, 
ERISA, and other labor statutes.88 Moreover, the DOL largely embraced a 
broad conception of labor rights, staking out positions that bolstered the 
protections of unauthorized immigrant workers both in the context of labor 
enforcement as well as in related contexts like immigration enforcement in 
the workplace.89  
Increasing transparency in the administration of our nation’s labor laws 
made particular sense in the restaurant industry. Not only are restaurants 
among the least compliant businesses operating in the domestic labor 
market,90 they operate in an intensely consumer-oriented industry, which 
provides a hospitable environment for the kinds of market-based 
interventions enabled by increased transparency. Labor officials have long 
relied on a complaint-driven system of enforcement,91 but the pool of 
potential complainants has been limited to workers. Quite sensibly, the DOL 
and other workplace protection agencies tailored their complaint system to 
 
 
 87. All of this reflects the sentiment expressed in 2006 by then Economics Professor David Weil:  
Rather than focusing all energy and political capital on passing legislative initiatives, which 
could take years to implement, a new Congress or entering administration should bring to its 
regulatory agencies a clear and coherent plan for enforcing and implementing existing laws and 
regulations in order to achieve a focused set of public aims.  
See David Weil, Crafting a Progressive Workplace Regulatory Policy: Why Enforcement Matters, 28 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 125, 125–26 (2006). Professor Weil has since been appointed the Wage and 
Hour Administrator within the DOL. See Katie Johnston, BU Professor Takes on Task of Enforcing U.S. 
Wage Laws, BOSTON GLOBE (June 8, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/06/07/ 
professor-david-weil-brings-controversial-workplace-views-labor-department/N2k3YBB2S2pm2qLSh 
A0PSP/story.html. 
 88. See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Regulation by Amicus: The Department of Labor’s Policy 
Making in the Courts, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1223, 1267 (2013).  
 89. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, 
Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc., 735 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-17365); Brief for the Secretary 
of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Ojeda-Sanchez v. Bland Farms, LLC, 
499 F. App’x 897 (11th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-13835); United States Department of Labor Josendis, Amicus 
Letter, Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-12266); 
Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6–8, Ramos-
Barrientos v. Bland, 661 F.3d 587 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-13412). For examples of the Obama 
administration’s attempt to coordinate worksite immigration enforcement and labor enforcement, see 
Addendum to the Revised Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of Homeland 
Security and Labor Concerning Enforcement Activities at Worksites (May 5, 2016), 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/documents/MOU-Addendum.pdf.  
 90. See Working Below the Line: How Subminimum Wage for Tipped Restaurant Workers 
Violates International Human Rights Standards (Dec. 2015).  
 91. See David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem 
of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59 (2005).  
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workers who have the greatest access to information on whether a particular 
restaurant had run afoul of our nation’s workplace protections and who have 
incentives to blow the whistle given the remedies they stand to receive.92  
In 2011, the DOL held a competition for third parties to develop 
innovative tools to utilize DOL data for enforcement purposes. In October 
2011, the DOL announced the winning app, entitled “Eat Shop Sleep.”93 
This app integrated data from the popular consumer review site, Yelp, with 
DOL data allowing consumers to consider both customer reviews and labor 
data when making food choices.94 In 2013, the DOL once again put out a 
call for submissions for an app or social media tool that could facilitate labor 
enforcement.95 This time, the winner was the creator of a website, 
LaborSight.com, which utilized Google Maps data to create a map 
highlighting businesses with federal labor law violations.96 This too fits 
within the larger regulatory efforts on the part of the Obama administration 
to harness data in protecting consumers.97 
In utilizing app-based technology, the DOL explicitly describes these 
apps in consumer protection terms:  
More and more, consumers recognize that the choices they make can 
affect individuals and communities at any point along the supply 
chain, and socially responsible consumers want to make sure that the 
products they purchase don’t cause any harm. Fair-trade products, 
sweatshop-free products, environmentally sound products—we see 
 
 
 92. See Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement through 
Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552 (2010); Weil & Pyles, supra note 91. 
 93. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor Announces Winners of 
Online and Mobile Development Contests (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ 
opa/opa20111568.htm [https://perma.cc/DR8N-ADPA]. The Eat Shop Sleep is also currently 
unavailable. In response to inquiries about the status of the app, representatives from both iTunes and 
Google Play indicated that the most likely explanation is that the developer—in this case, DOL—most 
likely removed the app. The DOL did not respond to my inquiry. 
 94. See Jeremy Blasi, Using Compliance Transparency to Combat Wage Theft, 20 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 95, 107–112 (2012).  
 95. See Laura Fortman, Calling All Innovative Minds: Take the DOL Fair Labor Data Challenge, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. BLOG (July 9, 2013), https://perma.cc/BWR9-N4GP.  
 96. Unfortunately, the website laborsight.com is no longer active. The enforcement tool is powered 
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). See Fact Sheet: White House Safety 
Datapalooza, OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY (Jan. 10, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/safety_datapalooza_factsheet_jan-2014.pdf.  
 97. See, e.g., Media Advisory, Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Exec. Office of the President, The 
White House, U.S. Department of Transportation, and U.S. Department of Agriculture to Host Safety 
Datapalooza (Jan. 10, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ 
ostp/safety_datapalooza_advisory.pdf (honoring Katherine Champagne, the creator of laborsight.com). 
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them everywhere because these considerations have become an 
important part of a consumer’s decision-making.98 
Importantly, the “Eat Shop Sleep” app was a two-way street. Not only were 
consumers able to learn whether a particular restaurant was investigated or 
penalized for labor violations, it also included a “take action” button, which 
allowed anyone with a smartphone to communicate with the DOL. This 
effectively turned any customer into a potential whistleblower. The app 
allowed both workers and consumers to file a complaint against an 
employer, to contact a local Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) office, or to submit questions about one’s rights in the workplace.  
The DOL has other enforcement programs that similarly seek to harness 
the public’s ability to vote with their dollars. The DOL makes public a list 
of willful violator employers under its temporary H visa program.99 The 
violators are those employers who seek out noncitizen workers without 
adequately accounting for the adverse labor consequences for citizen and 
other authorized workers.100 When an employer is a government contractor 
or subcontractor and willfully violates labor certification requirements, it is 
debarred for a period of three years during which time it is ineligible for 
government contracts.101 This list is also publicly available.102 A similar list 
exists for Farm Labor Contractors (FLCs), which are persons or entities 
engaging in the recruitment and employment of migrant farm workers under 
a federal temporary work visa program.103 FLCs are responsible for 
transporting and housing workers and providing payroll information. The 
DOL oversees this process by forcing all FLCs to register with the agency, 
thereby ensuring that workers have access to basic protections on farms.104 
The DOL makes available to the public a list of registered FLCs105 as well 
 
 
 98. See DOL Challenge Leads to Consumer Protection App, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR BLOG (Mar. 9, 
2012), http://blog.dol.gov/2012/03/09/dol-challenge-leads-to-consumer-protection-app/ [https://perma. 
cc/UM6U-26PN].  
 99. See H-1B Willful Violator List of Employers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (last visited Nov. 12, 2016), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/immigration/h1bwillfulviolator.htm [https://perma.cc/4UYX-CUAL]. 
 100. See Fact Sheet #62S: What Is a Willful Violator Employer?, WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR (2008), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/FactSheet62/whdfs62S.pdf. See also 20 
C.F.R. § 655, subpts. H, I (2016). 
 101. See 29 C.F.R. § 5.12(a)(1) (2016).  
 102. See H-1B Debarred/Disqualified List of Employers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (last visited Nov. 
12, 2016), http://www.dol.gov/whd/immigration/H1BDebarment.htm [https://perma.cc/WX39-6J45]. 
 103. See 29 U.S.C. § 1802(7) (2012) (defining a farm labor contractor). Temporary farm workers 
come in through the H-2A category. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2012). 
 104. See Michael H. LeRoy, Farm Labor Contractors and Agricultural Producers as Joint 
Employers under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act: An Empirical Public 
Policy Analysis, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175 (1998).  
 105. See Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA) Registered Farm Labor 
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as those that are ineligible and have been debarred as contractors.106 All of 
this information targets diners and eaters, who are increasingly attuned to a 
food item’s journey from farm to fork.107 And more to the point: all of this 
information concerns links in the supply chain critical to a food product’s 
journey to a consumer’s plate. Therefore, information about working 
conditions at other links of the food chain also provides leverage against 
bad-actor employers within the restaurant industry.108  
III. CONSUMING FOR JUSTICE 
Delegating some enforcement power to consumers offers an attractive 
solution to a larger problem tied to agency resource constraints. Labor 
officials and others working within workplace enforcement agencies have 
struggled against the enormity of the enforcement challenge: there are far 
too many food and drinking establishments for workplace enforcement 
agencies to inspect and punish. The food industry has consistently proven 
itself to be among the worst violators of federal and state labor laws109 with 
cooks, dishwashers, and food preparers experiencing high rates of minimum 
wage violations, overtime violations, and off-the-clock violations.110 That 
 
 
Contractor Listing January 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (last visited Nov. 12, 2016), 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/statutes/FLCList.htm.  
 106. See Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA) Ineligible Farm Labor 
Contractors – January 2017, U.S. DEP’T LAB. (last visited Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.dol. 
gov/whd/regs/statutes/mspa_debar.htm. 
 107. See John Cranfield, Spencer Henson, & James Holliday, The Motives, Benefits, and Problems 
of Conversion to Organic Production, 27 Agric. Hum. Values 291, 291 (2010) (discussing the growing 
demand for organic foods in Canada); Katie M. Abrams, Courtney A. Meyers, and Tracy A. Irani, 
Naturally Confused: Consumers’ Perceptions of All-Natural and Organic Pork Products, 27 Agric. 
Hum. Values 365, 365 (2010) (discussing growing consumer demand in the United States for natural 
and organic foods).  
 108. The DOL appears poised to increase its use of this regulatory tactic. In a 2010 audit of the 
DOL’s foreign certification program, the Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) found that the DOL 
did not fully utilize its “debarment authority provided in the [Immigration and Nationality Act] and did 
not consider other regulatory suspension and debarment authority.” OFFICE OF AUDIT, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, DEBARMENT AUTHORITY SHOULD BE USED MORE EXTENSIVELY IN FOREIGN LABOR 
CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS 3 (2010), http://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2010/05-10-002-03-
321.pdf. For this reason, the OIG recommended that labor officials take greater steps to oversee 
employers seeking to sponsor temporary workers. Id. 
 109. See FOOD CHAIN WORKERS ALLIANCE, supra note 9, at 20. 
 110. DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT 39 
(2010). These high rates place the restaurant industry in the top fifteen low-wage industries identified 
for enforcement by the DOL. Id. In a high-density community like Los Angeles County, the numbers 
can be staggering. The DOL estimated that 72% of all restaurants in the county operated in violation of 
FLSA. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, US Labor Department’s Wage and Hour Division 
Launches Enforcement and Education Initiative Focused on Los Angeles Area Restaurants (Apr. 18, 
2012), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/WHD20120407.htm [https://perma.cc/E4RK-AH2C]. 
See also Ruth Milkman, Ana Luz González, & Peter Ikeler, Wage and Hour Violations in Urban Labour 
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unions have not traditionally had great success organizing these workforces 
places even greater pressure on public officials to expend their limited 
resources wisely and with maximum deterrent effect.111 Consumers, then, 
offer a way to supplement and bolster enforcement efforts. But can 
consumption operate as a force for social change? Three conditions tend to 
increase the likelihood that transparency-based schemes can advance labor 
justice goals: consumer wealth, norm consensus, and an established 
intermediation infrastructure.  
A. Consumer Wealth 
To start with an obvious point, consumers can support exploited workers 
only to the extent their incomes allow them to do so. This has proven to be 
one of the most persistent obstacles to successfully utilizing ethical 
consumption platforms. Some shoppers are simply too poor to support 
markets for ethically produced goods.112 Rather, the model of reform 
predicated on consumer-worker alliances rests on a binary in which 
consumers play the role of privileged and affluent allies to subordinated and 
economically insecure organizers. For example, unions used to affix labels 
on goods produced by unionized workplaces as a way of politicizing the 
consumer class.113 But as food scholar Dana Frank explains:  
Historically, one problem in promoting the union label was that 
working-class shoppers could not afford to choose it. Middle-class 
shoppers, by contrast, have more discretionary income. If they 
choose, they are able to buy organic food at high-priced natural food 
stores, for example. They can select pricier Fair Trade Coffee. 
Working-class people, by contrast, are more likely to shop at Costco 
or Wal-Mart and buy their coffee in a name-brand can.114 
Translating these historical examples into modern policy can also be 
challenging given the difficulty of measuring labor-related information’s 
impact on shopping behavior. Consumers may indicate a willingness to pay 
a premium for ethically produced goods even if their actual shopping habits 
 
 
Markets: A Comparison of Los Angeles, New York and Chicago, 43 INDUS. REL. J. 378 (2012).  
 111. See Ashar, supra note 8, at 1881.  
 112. See Alison Hope Alkon et al., Foodways of the Urban Poor, 48 GEOFORUM 126 (2013).  
 113. See LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE MAKING OF 
CONSUMER SOCIETY (1997); Michael A. Gordon, The Labor Boycott in New York City, 1880-1886, 16 
Labor History 184 (1975). 
 114. See Dana Frank, Where are the Workers in Consumer-Worker Alliances? Class Dynamics and 
the History of Consumer-Labor Campaigns, 31 POL. & SOC’Y 363, 374 (2003). 
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suggest otherwise.115 Yet, despite the limitations of the existing empirical 
picture, a number of studies on garments do suggest that under certain 
conditions, consumers’ shopping patterns have been positively impacted by 
information relating to the working conditions of goods they buy.  
In a series of papers, Professor Michael Hiscox helped demonstrate that 
information on fair labor conditions can have a positive impact on consumer 
behavior. For example, Professor Hiscox and Jens Hainmueller conducted 
field experiments on the impact of “fair labor standards” labels on consumer 
shopping habits.116 They found that at least some segments of the shopping 
public demonstrated support for goods produced through ethical working 
conditions. The study confirmed the intuitive point that a consumer’s 
willingness to pay the “fair labor” price premium was in part a function of 
income. While such labels can have a positive impact on those who are in a 
position to purchase higher-priced goods, they are unlikely to have an 
impact on more cost-conscious shoppers.117 In a separate study, Professor 
Hiscox found similar results for consumers using eBay to purchase shirts 
and fair trade coffee with fair working conditions labels.118 Thus, there is 
some evidence that market-based mechanisms such as charging premiums 
for ethically sourced goods can work in the food context. 
Another set of studies confirms that consumers are willing to pay a 
modest premium to avoid buying goods not made from sweatshop labor. 
Sociologists have found that when faced with a choice between two 
seemingly identical pair of socks—one displayed a label indicating that it 
was not made under sweatshop conditions while the other reflect no such 
label—customers were willing to pay a modest premium in order to avoid 
the possibility of buying something made under exploitative work 
 
 
 115. See Jens Hainmueller & Michael J. Hiscox, The Socially Conscious Consumer? Field 
Experimental Tests of Consumer Support for Fair Labor Standards 4 (MIT Political Sci. Dep’t, Research 
Paper No. 2012-15), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2062435 (summarizing 
survey data on consumer preferences for goods produced under decent working conditions but noting 
real possibility of divergent consumer preferences between real market settings and survey answers). 
 116. Id.  
 117. Hainmueller and Hiscox conducted field experiments in Banana Republic Factory Stores, 
which sell discounted clothing items. Their study found that labels with information about the fair labor 
conditions that produced a garment had a “substantial positive effect” on “women shoppers interested 
in a higher priced item.” Their study also found that such labels had no “statistically significant impact” 
on those customers shopping for lower priced women’s and men’s garments. See id. at 2. 
 118. See Michael J. Hiscox, Michael Broukhim, & Claire S. Litwin, Consumer Demand for Fair 
Trade: New Evidence from a Field Experiment Using eBay Auctions of Fresh Roasted Coffee 3 (Mar. 
16, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1811783 
(finding that a “fair trade” label positively impacted consumer bids for coffee); Michael J. Hiscox et al., 
Consumer Demand for Fair Labor Standards: Evidence from a Field Experiment on eBay (Apr. 12 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1811788 (finding that 
fair working condition certification labels positively impacted consumer bids on polo shirts on eBay).  
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conditions.119 This study is significant in that it targets consumers of more 
modest means suggesting that a market for ethically-produced goods may 
find support beyond the class of wealthy consumers. Thus, these studies 
show that consumers do consider the ethical consequences of their 
purchases and are willing to pay a modest premium in order to avoid 
generating those consequences, at least in certain circumstances.  
In the context of food, Lucy Atkinson’s studies of “socially conscious” 
food consumption lends some support to the notion that consumers might 
be willing to support ethically-produced goods.120 Relying on interview data 
gathered from respondents in Texas, Atkinson found that many sought out 
food options from local sources or community gardens as a part of their 
“civic-minded” approach to food consumption.121 These food choices not 
only advanced society’s ethical goals, but the informants also often 
experienced a sense of personal empowerment.122 They are concerned not 
just with the price of the product or maximizing benefit but also with the 
food product’s “political, social, and environmental consequences.”123 But 
none of the study’s participants directly addressed the issue of labor 
injustice limiting the reach of the findings.  
Moreover, Atkinson drew from a tightly circumscribed pool of 
informants—“white, middle-class, college-educated consumers who self-
identify as socially conscious”124—and even they acknowledged the 
significant costs and inconveniences associated with this food market.125 
Not only did shoppers have to pay price premiums for these ethically 
produced goods, they often had to visit multiple vendors to meet all of their 
shopping needs.126 In this way, Atkinson’s study mirrors the findings 
offered by Hiscox’s studies: the goods positively impacted by fair labor 
 
 
 119. See Monica Prasad, Howard Kimeldorf, Rachel Meyer, & Ian Robinson, Consumers of the 
World Unite: A Market-based Response to Sweatshops, 29 LABOR STUDIES JOURNAL 57, 71 (2004); 
Howard Kimeldorf, Rachel Meyer, Monica Prasad, & Ian Robinson, Consumers with a Conscience: Will 
They Pay More?, 5 CONTEXTS 24 (2006). 
 120. Lucy Atkinson, Buying In to Social Change: How Private Consumption Choices Engender 
Concern for the Collective, 644 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 191, 191 (2012). 
 121. Id. at 196. 
 122. Id. at 199. Atkinson found that many of the informants viewed ethical consumption as a way 
to facilitate “an individual’s growth and evolution into the person he or she hopes to become.” Id. at 
200. 
 123. See Veronika A. Andorfer & Ulf Liebe, Consumer Behavior in Moral Markets. On the 
Relevance of Identity, Justice Beliefs, Social Norms, Status, and Trust in Ethical Consumption, 29 EUR. 
SOC. REV. 1251, 1251 (2013).  
 124. See Atkinson, supra note 120, at 195. 
 125. Id. at 201–202. 
 126. Id. at 201. 
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standards labels in his studies were higher end goods.127 And because price 
and geographic distances both operate to place these kinds of goods out of 
the reach of the food insecure,128 consumer wealth operates as a key 
determinant for effectively implementing these types of schemes.129 
B. Norm Consensus 
Enlisting the help of diners and eaters to discipline restaurants amounts 
to a delegation of sorts. Agencies like the DOL have given the consumers 
the information they need to vote with their dollars. But these sorts of 
nudges work best when a particular regulatory goal tracks well-settled 
public norms and everyone agrees why disclosures related to that goal are 
relevant or important.130 Restaurant health grading systems, for example, 
are widely (though not uniformly) understood as successful models of 
consumer-oriented disclosure schemes.131 This is because the goal of the 
grades is to achieve a public policy outcome that invites little if any dissent: 
to reduce the spread of foodborne illnesses. By contrast, in the context of 
labor enforcement, consumers might have divergent views on whether 
working conditions for food and restaurant workers are so deplorable that 
they require consumer support. For this reason, even where a study points 
to positive impacts on consumer behavior, it is hard to generalize about a 
program’s efficacy when implemented in different contexts.132 Existing 
empirical data do not offer a broadly applicable or generalizable set of 
principles to guide industry-wide reform. Some studies focus on specific 
case studies that only partially translate to the food regulation context.133 
 
 
 127. See Michael J. Hiscox & Nicholas F.B. Smyth, Is There Consumer Demand for Improved 
Labor Standards? Evidence from Field Experiments in Social Product Labeling 15 (2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hiscox/files/consumerdemandfairlaborstandardsevidence 
social.pdf (noting that towels and candles sold at the experiment site involved “a specific set of New 
Yorkers who could afford to buy high-quality furnishings”).  
 128. See Alkon et al., supra note 112, at 133 (noting that for many low-income residents of Oakland 
and Chicago, “[t]he primary barrier to obtaining desired foods was lack of income, not proximity or lack 
of knowledge.”).  
 129. Some suggest that these types of laws are better at drawing attention to the harms than actually 
altering the public’s shopping choices. See Frank, supra note 114, at 371.  
 130. Behavioral economists explain that a data point’s relevance often has to be immediately 
ascertainable to the consumer in order for disclosure schemes to work. See David Weil et al., The 
Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155, 161 (2006).  
 131. See id. at 169–70. For a more critical take, see Ho, supra note 27. 
 132. See David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155 (2006). 
 133. See Hainmueller & Hiscox, supra note 115 (testing consumer support for fair labor standards 
labels in the clothing context); Monica Prasad et al, Consumers of the World Unite: A Market-based 
Response to Sweatshops, 29 LAB. STUD. J. 57 (2004) (examining consumer demand for sweatshop-free 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/7
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Others examine the impact of ethical considerations on food purchasing 
decisions but address issues that are only tangentially related to labor 
injustice.134 Ultimately, utilizing disclosure schemes requires harnessing 
consumer empathy, something that psychologists have shown is hard for the 
non-poor to do in relation to the poor.135  
Further complicating matters is the food system’s pervasive dependence 
on immigrant labor—authorized and unauthorized—which invites a range 
of consumer responses.136 The agricultural industry, for example, has 
historically depended on unauthorized workers, especially from Mexico.137 
By some estimates, over 70% of agricultural workers are unauthorized, with 
a significant portion of the remainder working as guest workers.138 The 
meat-packing and -processing industry provides another example. As this 
industry has reorganized and established itself as a major employer in the 
Midwest and South, unauthorized migration has predictably grown in those 
regions.139 One study estimated that 27% of all workers who butcher and 
process meat, poultry, and fish are unauthorized.140 Another study suggested 
that between 1980 and 2000, the percentage of Latino workers in meat 
processing plants jumped from 8.5% to 28.5%.141 Indeed, the growth of the 
meat packing industry parallels the growth of the Latino population in these 
 
 
socks). 
 134. See Atkinson, supra note 120; Thomas Macias, Working Toward a Just, Equitable, and Local 
Food System: The Social Impact of Community-Based Agriculture, 89 SOC. SCI. Q. 1086 (2008).  
 135. See Martin Gilens, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF 
ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1999); Stéphane Côté, et al., For Whom Do the Ends Justify the Means? Social 
Class and Utilitarian Moral Judgment, 104 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 490 (2013); Michael W. 
Kraus, et al., Social Class, Contextualism, and Empathetic Accuracy, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1716 (2010); 
Paul K. Piff, Wealth and the Inflated Self: Class, Entitlement, and Narcissism, 40 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 34 (2014). 
 136. See Jennifer Merolla et al, “Illegal,” “Undocumented” or “Unauthorized”: Equivalency 
Frames, Issue Frames, and Public Opinion on Immigration, 11 Perspectives on Politics 789 (2013); Jens 
Hainmueller & Daniel J. Hopkins, The Hidden Americans Immigration Consensus: Conjoint Analysis 
of Attitudes toward Immigrants, 59 American Journal of Political Science 529 (2015).  
 137. Much of the history of unauthorized labor migration in the agricultural industry is tied into the 
history of guest worker programs. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE 
MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2004); KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, 
IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. (1992). 
 138. See GRAY, supra note 9, at 62. 
 139. See Paul Apostolidis, Hegemony and Hamburger: Migration Narratives and Democratic 
Unionism among Mexican Meatpackers in the U.S. West, 58 POL. RES. Q. 647 (2005); Georgeanne Artz, 
et al., Is It a Jungle Out There? Meat Packing, Immigrants, and Rural Communities, 35 J. AGRIC. & 
RESOURCE ECON. 299 (2010); Kandel & Parrado, supra note 9. 
 140. Jeffrey Passel, The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the 
U.S.: Estimates Based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey 12, table 1, Pew Hispanic Center 
(March 7, 2006).  
 141. William Kandel & Emilio A. Parrado, Restructuring of the US Meat Processing Industry and 
New Hispanic Migrant Destinations, 31 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 447, 459 table 6 (2005).  
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regions,142 providing important macroeconomic context to the spate of anti-
immigrant ordinances that have sprouted in these areas.143  
All of this points to the possibility that while consumers might feel 
inclined to support workers experiencing violations of wage theft, any 
inclination to do so might dissipate for unauthorized immigrant workers. A 
good example is the French Gourmet, a French restaurant and catering 
business in San Diego. The owner, Michel Malecot, has employed hundreds 
of workers.144 As required by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 
he examined employment verification forms submitted by his workers, and 
on this basis, he concluded they were authorized to work—that is, they were 
either citizens or noncitizens with work authorization (such as green card 
holders).145 After putting several workers on the payroll, the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) sent Malecot a notice that the identities associated 
with submitted social security numbers did not match the identities offered 
by the workers. Despite these “no match” letters, Malecot allegedly 
continued to employ the affected employees in cash until they could 
produce different employment documents.146 Shortly thereafter, 
Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE) arrested eighteen workers 
and indicted Malecot along with Richard Kauffmann, the manager, for 
violating various immigration laws.147 Eventually, they pled guilty, and the 
district court ordered them to pay $400,000 in fines and placed them on 
probation for five and three years, respectively.148  
 
 
 142. One study found that counties with meat packing plants saw significant growth. In counties 
with less than 5% meat packing plant (MPP) employment share, the Latino (“Hispanic”) population 
grew an added thirteen percentage points relative to counties without meat packing facilities. In counties 
with more than 20% MPP employment share, the Latino population rose almost two hundred percentage 
points. See id. at 305–06. 
 143. For example, in Keller v. City of Fremont, the Eighth Circuit upheld an anti-immigrant 
ordinance in Fremont, Nebraska, requiring renters to obtain occupancy licenses that verified immigration 
status. 719 F.3d 931, 945 (8th Cir. 2013). Two of the largest employers in Fremont are the Hormel Foods 
Corporation, which produces Spam, and Fremont Beef Company. See Ted Genoways, This Land is Not 
Your Land: Deciding Who Belongs in America, HARPER’S MAG., Feb. 2013, at 33–35. 
 144. See Richard Marosi & Anna Gorman, Immigration Agency Targets Upscale San Diego 
Restaurant, L.A. TIMES (May 25, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/25/local/la-me-imm-
gourmet-20100525. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See Indictment, United States v. The French Gourmet, No. 3:10-cr-01417 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 
2010); Findings and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge Upon a Plea of Guilty United States v. 
The French Gourmet, No. 3:10-cr-01417 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011); Order Accepting Guilty Plea, United 
States v. The French Gourmet, No. 3:10-cr-01417 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2011). 
 147. See News Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, San Diego-area Bakery, Its 
Owner and Manager, Indicted on Federal Charges for Hiring Undocumented Workers (Apr. 21, 2010), 
http://www.fosterglobal.com/news/san_diego_bakery042110.pdf.  
 148. See News Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, San Diego-area Bakery Owner, 
Manager Sentenced for Employing Illegal Workers (Dec. 22, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/ 
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Malecot’s investigation and eventual conviction fit within the broader 
attempt to target high profile bad actors to draw the consuming public's 
attention to the issue of employing unauthorized workers.149 And these cases 
have sparked an array of consumer responses. Some would punish these 
businesses for the act of hiring unauthorized workers irrespective of how 
the workers were treated.150 Others reach the opposite conclusion: the only 
restaurants whose windows should be shuttered are those that violate labor 
laws without any regard for their incompliance with immigration laws.151  
Malecot admitted that during a three-year period he hired ninety-one 
workers without authorization—but very little suggested that they created 
unsafe or hostile work conditions.152 Indeed, in ordering probation, the 
district court judge noted that Malecot did not use workers’ unauthorized 
status to exploit them and that Kauffmann did not profit from the illegal 
hirings.153 In speaking to news media, Malecot’s lawyer emphasized that 
these workers were treated fairly and paid above average wages.154 While 
unauthorized workers are entitled to a wide range of basic labor and 
employment protections,155 the public remains divided over whether they 
ought to benefit from such protections given their immigration status. In the 
case of the French Gourmet, the raid seemed to have a galvanizing effect, 
causing customers to support the restaurant, though again, for a variety of 
reasons ranging from concerns over the negative impact of over-
enforcement on local economic growth to the simple reason that Malecot 
makes good food.156 Thus, immigration status not only deters workers from 
filing complaints in the first place, it also might lead the public to penalize 
restaurants for reasons that have nothing to do with working conditions. 
 
 
news/releases/san-diego-area-bakery-owner-manager-sentenced-employing-illegal-workers [https://perma. 
cc/Q75U-XCLP] [hereinafter ICE Dec. News Release]. 
 149. See Marosi & Gorman, supra note 144 (quoting ICE chief of enforcement, John Morton, as 
stating, “Even a small amount of concerted, uniform enforcement can get a lot of attention—and it has.”). 
 150. See Sarah Kershaw, Immigration Crackdown Steps Into the Kitchen, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/08/dining/08crackdown.html. 
 151. See id.  
 152. $10,000 of the $400,000 fine was for restitution for an injured employee. ICE Dec. News 
Release, supra note 148.  
 153. See Dana Littlefield, Two Get Probation in French Gourmet Case, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. 
(Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-2-men-get-probation-illegal-hiring-case-
2011dec22-story.html [https://perma.cc/Y2M2-5G5K]. 
 154. Dana Littlefield, Two Get Probation in French Gourmet Case, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Dec. 
22, 2011), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-2-men-get-probation-illegal-hiring-case-
2011dec22-story.html [https://perma.cc/Y2M2-5G5K]. 
 155. See Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A Model for Enforcing 
the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247, 257–258 (2009).  
 156. See Marosi & Gorman, supra note 144. 
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C. Intermediation Infrastructure 
A restaurant owner who suffers a loss of business because of disclosed 
labor violations not only must cease her exploitative ways, she must also 
rehabilitate her reputation among the dining public. This rehabilitation can 
mean demonstrating that the restaurant not only meets but actually exceeds 
industry labor standards.157 This fits within Professor David Vogel’s 
argument that corporate social responsibility, as a regulatory regime, can 
create “markets for virtue” under some conditions.158 During the 1990s, the 
shoe company giant, Nike, suffered significant public blowback when an 
internal report prepared by the accounting firm Ernst & Young showed that 
factory workers in Vietnam suffered from exposure to hazardous 
chemicals.159 This widespread condemnation forced Nike to commit 
resources to monitoring exploitative conditions up the supply chain. To 
assuage public concern, Nike adopted a more transparent approach to doing 
business by, for example, disclosing the locations of plants in various Asian 
countries with whom it had manufacturing contracts. By pulling back the 
curtain a bit, Nike allowed for independent monitoring of labor standards.160 
From a monitoring infrastructure perspective, the restaurant industry is 
in some ways well-positioned to adopt transparency-type schemes to 
eradicate exploitation.161 As discussed earlier, consumers are already 
primed to consider information related to their food when making dining 
choices. At the same time, consumers can be fickle, which means markets 
for virtue can evaporate very quickly—perhaps for lack of interest or for 
lack of information on the ongoing compliance of once-bad-but-turned-
good restaurants or for too much irrelevant information creating unhelpful 
and distracting noise for consumers. Given the limitations of consumers to 
act as monitors of restaurants, third party intermediaries and brokers will 
have to play a role in gathering and disseminating information in a usable 
 
 
 157. See VOGEL, supra note 69.  
 158. Id. at 3. 
 159. See id. at 79. 
 160. See David Teather, Nike lists abuses at Asian Factories, The Guardian, April 14, 2005, at 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2005/apr/14/ethicalbusiness.money. Of course, not all 
companies have the kind of vast resources or attract as much consumer interest and attention as does 
Nike. For companies whose products are manufactured all over the world, even when leaders within 
those companies want to stamp out exploitative practices up the supply chain like the use of child labor 
or creating dangerous working conditions, it is hard for those companies to effectively monitor their 
business partners. See id. at 91–96. 
 161. In many ways, the labor recruitment model supporting food production industires mirror those 
of the garment and shoe industries. See Jennifer Gordon, Regulating the Human Supply Chain, 102 IOWA 
L. REV. 445, 478–479 (2017). 
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form. The federal government in recent years has tried to do just that 
through the DOL, but the infrastructure for disseminating this type of 
information remains underdeveloped as evidenced by the short-lived nature 
of apps like “Eat Shop Sleep.”162 Thus, while government agencies 
undoubtedly play an important role in regulating the information market, 
given their limitations, private third-parties will inevitably figure into the 
process of developing an intermediation infrastructure.   
Thus far, advocacy organizations have provided some notable examples 
of intermediation. Consumers increasingly want to know not just how food 
landed on their plate, but also how and from where the ingredients arrived 
in the kitchen, which gives advocates the opportunity to target distributors 
up the food supply chain. Take as another example the Coalition of 
Immokalee Workers (CIW), which has been waging a campaign for fair 
food in the Florida tomato industry. Embracing a motto of “Consumer 
Powered, Worker Certified,” CIW’s fair food program pressures larger, 
corporate food buyers to pledge to buy tomatoes only from growers who 
comply with standards set by the program.163 These pledges, in turn, place 
downward pressure on growers to comply with the fair food standards or 
else miss out on doing business with major supermarket and fast food chains 
like Wal-Mart, Chipotle Mexican Grill, Trader Joe’s, Subway, Burger King, 
McDonalds, and Whole Foods Market.164 As a condition of certification, 
growers must agree to oversight by the Fair Food Standards Council, which 
has a 24-hour hotline to receive complaints from workers about alleged 
violations.165 The CIW model of intermediation not only helps gather and 
disseminate information about a food producer’s working conditions, it 
 
 
 162. Many scholars who have addressed disclosure policies have focused on the intermediation 
provided by private actors. See Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 377–78 (2011); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” For Everyone 
(And Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699 (2006). To take two familiar examples from related 
contexts, Yelp, a consumer review website, and the National Association for Law Placement (NALP), 
an organization devoted to legal career counseling, exemplify the broader universe of third-parties who 
profit off intermediation of information about businesses and employers. Although I am interested in 
private actors, I focus on a broader array of intermediaries including government agencies like the DOL. 
 163. See Fair Food Program Label Finds Its First Home at Whole Foods!, COAL. OF IMMOKALEE 
WORKERS (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.ciw-online.org/blog/2014/12/first-label/ [https://perma.cc/LJC4-
Y6AV]. These standards include among other things raising wages for farm workers, complying with 
workplace protections like rest breaks, and prohibiting sexual harassment and verbal abuse. See Steven 
Greenhouse, In Florida Tomato Fields, a Penny Buys Progress, N.Y. TIMES: BUSINESS DAY (Apr. 24, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/business/in-florida-tomato-fields-a-penny-buys-progress. 
html [https://perma.cc/QCF6-G4TF]. 
 164. See Partners, FAIR FOOD PROGRAM (last visited Nov. 28, 2016), http://www.fairfood 
program.org/partners/ [https://perma.cc/E5AZ-VJ4N]. See also Greenhouse, supra note 86. 
 165. See About, FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL (last visited Feb.14, 2017), http://fairfood 
standards.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/9ZN5-3JC9].  
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helps nurture and translate market interest into legal obligations through 
settlement166 and contract negotiations between workers and employers.  
In a similar fashion, the Restaurant Opportunities Center (ROC), a 
national collection of worker centers, published a series of eating guides 
with information on the degree to which restaurants comply with a variety 
of labor and employment protections.167 This eating guide operates as a 
market-based certification system highlighting those restaurants taking the 
“high road” in the business and is analogous to the more formal certification 
governing the organic label.168 The entry costs into the organic market can 
be steep, but once they obtain certification, farmers can begin charging a 
premium, which allows them to recoup losses and begin profiting from 
sustainable farming practices.169 In the same vein, the “high road” restaurant 
model operates on the assumption that a customer will be willing to pay 
elevated prices if he or she knows that his or her money is going into the 
pockets of the workers and not the restaurant owner.170  
Advocacy organizations can intermediate by serving a screening 
function—that is, by identifying potentially exploitative workplaces for 
labor officials. Although incompliance is widespread among restaurants in 
the Los Angeles area, violations were particularly egregious in Koreatown 
during the 1990s.171 More than two-thirds Koreatown restaurants are owned 
by Koreans, many of whom are immigrants. Some have suggested that 
incompliance in these restaurants stems from a combination of lack of 
familiarity with U.S. and California laws and adherence to a different set of 
employer-worker norms.172 During the 1990s, Korean Immigrant Workers 
Advocates (KIWA)173 helped launch a campaign against the Koreatown 
 
 
 166. See James Gray Pope, A Free Labor Approach to Human Trafficking, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 
1863 (2009); Ashar, supra note 8, at 1916. 
 167. See, e.g., 2013 ROC DINERS’ GUIDE, supra note 32. 
 168. See SARU JAYARAMAN, FORKED: A NEW STANDARD FOR AMERICAN DINING (Oxford Univ. 
Press ed., 2016); Restaurant Opportunities Center United, 2014’s New High Road Restaurants (Jan. 6, 
2014), at http://rocunited.org/2014/01/2014s-new-high-road-restaurants/. 
 169. See Patricia Allen & Martin Kovach, The capitalist composition of organic: The Potential of 
markets in fulfilling the promise of organic agriculture, 17 Agriculture and Human Values 221, 225 
(2000).  
 170. See SARU JAYARAMAN, FORKED: A NEW STANDARD FOR AMERICAN DINING (Oxford Univ. 
Press ed., 2016).  
 171. See Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave Organizing: Creative Campaign Strategies of the Los 
Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 483 (2005); Daisy Ha, An Analysis and Critique 
of KIWA’s Reform Efforts in the Los Angeles Korean American Restaurant Industry, 8 ASIAN AM. L.J. 
111, 122–25 (2001); K. Connie Kang, 41 Restaurants Violated Labor Laws, LA Times, Aug. 22, 1998.  
 172. See Daisy Ha, An Analysis and Critique of KIWA’s Reform Efforts in the Los Angeles Korean 
American Restaurant Industry, 8 ASIAN L.J. 111, 122–25 (2001).  
 173. The organization has since changed its name to the Koreatown Immigrant Workers Alliance. 
ASIAN AMERICANS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL, CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL HISTORY 
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restaurant industry.174 This campaign led to further investigations and 
sanctions by state and federal labor enforcement agencies.175 
All of these examples—CIW, ROC, and KIWA—illustrate the 
complicated information economy in which intermediaries must broker 
transactions. They must engage employers, the dining public, and 
government officials across a variety of circumstances. But the through-line 
connecting all of these examples is that the intermediating decision begins 
with what the workers themselves want. These are not attempts to do 
anything “on behalf of” workers, but rather with and by them.176 
IV. SUPPLEMENTS, NOT SUBSTITUTES 
So ethical consumption schemes sometimes work. Certainly, reform-
minded individuals should continue to find ways to leverage consumer 
interest to improve working conditions. But this shouldn’t be all that they 
(and we) do. In this Part, I want to press the point that disclosure laws that 
educate consumers on food system exploitation should operate as 
supplements, not substitutes, for traditional worker-initiated programs. As I 
explain, there are some values that are best vindicated when workers take 
the lead in shaping the scope and purpose of disclosure schemes, namely 
autonomy, equity, and community standing. In explaining the importance 
of prioritizing these values, I focus on the challenges workers face in the 
restaurant industry. Although numerous links in the food chain could benefit 
from a more explicit recognition of these worker-centric values—farms and 
meatpacking plants are just two examples—the frequency with which 
Americans dine out means that most consumers have at least a sense of what 
restaurant workers do. Far fewer can say the same thing about farmworkers 
or meatpackers. For this reason, I focus on how disclosure schemes might 
worker given the peculiar contours of workplace protections in restaurants.       
If the restaurant industry is not recession proof, then it is something close 
to it. In December 2007, the country entered one of the worst economic 
recessions in decades, and yet the restaurant industry as a whole has not 
 
 
724 (Xiaojian Zhao & Edward J.W. Park eds., 2014). 
 174. See Jong Bum Kwan, The Koreatown Immigrant Workers Alliance: Spatializing Justice in an 
Ethnic “Enclave”, in WORKING FOR JUSTICE: THE L.A. MODEL OF ORGANIZING AND ADVOCACY (Ruth 
Milkman et. al. eds., 2013). See also Ha, supra note 172, at 122–25. 
 175. See K. Connie Kang, 41 Restaurants Violated Labor Laws, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 22, 1998), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/aug/22/local/me-15443 (reporting that a DOL investigation of forty-
three Koreatown-area restaurants found that two hundred workers were underpaid by $250,000). 
 176. See Dana Frank, Where are the Workers in Consumer-Worker Alliances? Class Dynamics and 
the History of Consumer-Labor Campaigns, 31 POL. & SOC’Y 363, 374 (2003). 
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only managed to survive but also has thrived.177 Annual sales in food service 
firms have steadily increased over the last decade, as has the money that 
people are spending at restaurants.178 Over the last half-century, Americans 
have allocated more and more of their food budgets for food prepared 
outside of the home.179 Yet, despite the public’s clamoring for restaurant 
food, restaurant workers routinely hover around the poverty line.180  
Disclosure laws help consumers make more ethical dining choices by 
providing information that helps distinguish restaurants that comply with 
labors laws from those that do not. But economic harms experienced by 
restaurant workers are structural in nature. That is, workers often still 
struggle against poverty even where their employers comply with basic 
wage and hour and safety requirements. Cooks, dishwashers, waiters, 
bussers, and hosts all work at or near the minimum wage requirement.181 
 
 
 177. In 2007, the year the Great Recession began, food services and drinking places registered $444 
billion dollars in annual sales. In 2008, annual sales actually increased to $456 billion. This trend has 
largely continued. In 2014, that number reached $575 billion. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ESTIMATED 
ANNUAL SALES OF U.S. ACCOMMODATION AND FOOD SERVICES FIRMS BY KIND OF BUSINESS: 1992 
THROUGH 2012 (2015). 
 178. In 2007, Americans spent just under $420 billion at eating and drinking establishments, and 
that figure has risen to $521 billion in 2013. See Food Expenditures: Table 3—Food Away from Home: 
Total Expenditures, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV. (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.ers. 
usda.gov/webdocs/DataFiles/Food_Expenditures__17981/FoodExpenditures_table3.xls?v=42395. In 
1962, nearly 28% of one’s food budget was spent on away-from-home foods. In 2002, that number 
jumped up to 46%. See Food Expenditures: Table 10—Food Away from Home as a Share of Food 
Expenditures, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV. (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.ers.usda.gov/ 
webdocs/DataFiles/Food_Expenditures__17981/FoodExpenditures_table10.xls?v=42395 [hereinafter 
USDA Food Expenditures Table 10]. The USDA estimates that in 1978, 18% of our daily caloric intake 
was from away-from-home food, whereas in 1996, it was 32%. See JAYACHANDRAN N. VARIYAM, 
NUTRITION LABELING IN THE FOOD-AWAY-FROM-HOME SECTOR: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT2, fig. 2 
(2005). 
 179. USDA Food Expenditures Table 10, supra note 178. In 1963, Americans devoted 71% of their 
food budgets to “food at home” and only 29% of their food budgets to “food away from home.” The gap 
has steadily closed so that by 2010, Americans’ food budgets were evenly split between the two 
categories of food. In 2010, Americans spent 51.4% of their food budgets on food at home leaving 48.6% 
for food outside the home. Id. The majority of food-away-from-home sales occur in restaurants. See 
Food Service Industry: Market Segments, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECO. RESEARCH SERV. (last visited Nov. 
12, 2016), https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-markets-prices/food-service-industry/market-
segments/ (noting that full service and fast food restaurants account for 77% of all food-away-from-
home sales). The remaining purchases are made at hotels, motels, schools, colleges, stores, bars, vending 
machines, recreational places, and other establishments, including military outlets. See id. Today, one 
in twelve private sector workers in the United States is employed in the restaurant industry. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MAY 2010 NATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT 
AND WAGE ESTIMATES (2010).  
 180. See SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO ET AL., FAST FOOD, POVERTY WAGES: THE PUBLIC COST OF LOW-
WAGE JOBS IN THE FAST-FOOD INDUSTRY (2013), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/fast-food-poverty-
wages-the-public-cost-of-low-wage-jobs-in-the-fast-food-industry/. 
 181. See id. at 2. (“The median hourly wage for core nonmanagerial front-line fast-food workers, 
those working at least 27 weeks in a year and 10 hours a week, is $8.69 an hour.”). For years, the federal 
minimum wage remained frozen at $5.15. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/7
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And many restaurant workers receive tips during the course of their 
employment, which means that as “tipped employees,” they are not covered 
by the minimum wage threshold.182 Of course, states are free to set 
minimum wages for tipped employees above the minimum requirement. 
And, in recent years, a handful of localities have attracted national attention 
for their decision to increase the minimum wage requirement to $15 an hour 
for restaurants working within the fast food industry,183 but these examples 
remain outliers.184 All of this shows that relying on information about 
whether a restaurant has complied with workplace laws risks giving 
consumers a skewed perception of how restaurant workers actually fare on 
a daily basis. A fuller picture requires workers to weigh in themselves.    
A. Autonomy 
A common critique of consumer-oriented campaigns to alleviate 
exploitation up the supply chain is that such campaigns often disconnect 
workers from the larger process of holding bad actor employers 
accountable. In her critique of consumer-worker alliances, for example, 
Dana Frank explains:  
The risk is a model in which a man on a white horse rides into the 
 
 
104-188, § 2104(b), 110 Stat. 1755, 1928–29 (1997) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)) (increasing the 
minimum wage to $5.15 an hour beginning September 1, 1997). In 2007, Congress amended the FLSA 
to raise the minimum wage to the current requirement of $7.25. See Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007, 
Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 8102(a), 121 Stat. 188 (2007) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)) (requiring that 
the minimum wage be gradually raised over a two year period to $7.25 effective in 2009). 
 182. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(m)(1)–(2) (2012). In those instances, employers can pay a direct wage as 
low as $2.13 provided certain conditions are met, most importantly that an employee’s tips combined 
with the direct wages meet the federal $7.25 minimum wage benchmark. Other conditions include that 
the employee retains all of the tips and regularly receives more than $30 in tips per month. See Fact 
Sheet #15: Tipped Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR (July 2013), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs15.pdf. 
 183. The cities of Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles have all passed laws instituting a gradual 
increase in the minimum wage to $15. See Victor Luckerson, Here’s Every City in America Getting a 
$15 Minimum Wage, TIME MAG., July 23, 2015, http://time.com/3969977/minimum-wage/. Most 
recently, and perhaps most surprisingly, Governor Andrew Cuomo implemented a similar raise that will 
cover fast food restaurants within the entire state of New York. See Patrick McGeehan, New York Plans 
$15-an-Hour Minimum Wage for Fast Food Workers, N.Y. TIMES, (July 22, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/nyregion/new-york-minimum-wage-fast-food-workers.html. 
 184. To date, nineteen states and territories have adopted the $2.13 minimum wage and an additional 
five states have adopted a minimum wage under $3.00 an hour. The states and territories paying $2.13 
are: Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Nebraska, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Virgin 
Islands, and Wyoming. The following jurisdictions pay under $3 an hour: Arkansas ($2.63), Delaware 
($2.23), District of Columbia ($2.77), Pennsylvania ($2.83), Wisconsin ($2.33), and West Virginia 
($2.62). See Minimum Wages for Tipped Employees, U.S. DEP’T LAB. WAGE & HOUR DIV. (Aug. 1, 
2016), http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/tipped.htm [https://perma.cc/6E8Q-4XAU].  
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oppressed town, exposes exploitative conditions, points to helpless, 
passive workers, and then rides away. In this approach, strong, wise, 
U.S. middle-class people help a weak, ill-informed populace at the 
other end—which doesn’t talk back or make demands on the nature 
of the solidarity relationship. At worst, this can lead to consumer 
activities that the workers themselves do not agree with or have 
power over.185  
“The ultimate goal” of these campaigns, Frank insists, “is not middle-class 
people obtaining justice ‘for’ the working people at the other end but 
helping working people do so for themselves—in a long-term process of 
planned obsolescence.”186  
The very point of many workplace laws is to empower workers to help 
themselves. The prime example is the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA), which sets out an array of rights for workers to organize and 
engage in collective action.187 Other models, such as worker centers and 
social movement-centered litigation advance similar goals. For these 
advocates and organizers, it is not enough for consumers to help workers 
achieve better working conditions. Rather, the primary goal is to help 
workers achieve those conditions for themselves.188  
Of course, in the restaurant context, protection under the law is not so 
much the issue as it is the enforcement of those protections. Still, labor 
organizations remain an attractive institutional partner and service provider 
for these workers, many of whom are immigrants. In her ethnographic work 
on Mexican immigrant busboys in Chicago, Professor Gomberg-Munoz 
explains that these busboys—many unauthorized immigrants—relish in 
 
 
 185. See Frank, supra note 114, at 374.  
 186. Id. at 365. 
 187. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2694–
2700 (2008).  
 188. A number of immigration scholars have utilized the solidarity-enhancing and solidary-
rewarding elements of our workplace laws to develop theories supporting a robust set of immigrant 
rights providing a strong foundation for food justice scholars and advocates to build on. In my own work, 
I have defended the favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion for unauthorized immigrant workers. 
Labor claims provide an acceptable sorting mechanism for identifying those immigrants most likely to 
strengthen rather than undermine the interests of other workers. See Stephen Lee, Screening for 
Solidarity, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (2013). Relatedly, Hiroshi Motomura has argued that labor protections 
allow citizen workers to function as “interest surrogates” or “citizen proxies” for their unauthorized 
immigrant co-workers, highlighting the degree to which citizen and noncitizen interests can be 
comingled and intertwined. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration 
Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1751–54 (2010). And in one of the most robust assertions of labor-
based membership, Jennifer Gordon has argued for “transnational labor citizenship,” in which labor 
migration rules would be reformed to allow labor organizations to oversee the migration process. See 
Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (2007). 
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their racialized identities as hard workers.189 Yet these workers are also 
acutely aware that their unauthorized status puts pressure on them to work 
hard for fear of losing their jobs. Moreover, Gomberg-Munoz’s 
ethnography reveals how several of these workers value “union job[s]” 
above all others because of the autonomy and professional boost such jobs 
provide.190 Thus, Professor Gomberg-Munoz observes that these workers 
must negotiate the short-term advantages of racialized stereotypes as hard 
workers against the long-term implications of reinforcing stereotypes and 
perpetuating oppressive work conditions.191 
Ths consumer protection approach to labor enforcement, in some ways, 
reproduces the same “savior” dynamic that can be found within anti-
trafficking approaches to worker exploitation, another common alternative 
to the NLRA worker-initiated model. By design, the road to remedy in the 
anti-trafficking context travels through state power exercised by law 
enforcement officials, which means workers participate in the process only 
passively as victims whose interests are vindicated by the criminal justice 
process. Professor Hila Shamir helpfully observes that while most anti-
trafficking efforts are organized around human rights principles, the realities 
of the trafficking industry suggest that regulators would be better off 
embracing a labor trafficking paradigm in which “[t]he workers are 
regarded as agents of change who, if given the tools to do so, can bargain 
for better working conditions and ultimately transform the employment 
practices and patterns in their work sector without any need to be rescued 
by either [nongovernmental organizations] or the authorities.”192 Within this 
paradigm, the workers themselves rather than government officials shape 
the contours of resistance against trafficking. Professor James Pope makes 
a similar point by advocating for a “free labor approach” to regulating 
trafficking.193 Thus, while the traditional trafficking paradigm captures only 
 
 
 189. See Ruth Gomberg-Munoz, Willing to Work: Agency and Vulnerability in an Undocumented 
Immigrant Network, 112 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 295 (2010). 
 190. See id. at 302. 
 191. See RUTH GOMBERG-MUNOZ, LABOR AND LEGALITY: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF A MEXICAN 
IMMIGRANT NETWORK 100 (2011) (“While being known as ‘hard workers’ has the benefit of making 
[unauthorized workers] indispensable at their jobs, it has the side effect of reproducing various 
exploitative aspects of their work, including intensification of their labor characterized by increasing 
workloads for the same pay.”); Ruth Gomberg-Munoz, Willing to Work: Agency and Vulnerability in an 
Undocumented Immigrant Network, 112 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 295 (2010). 
 192. See Hila Shamir, A Labor Paradigm for Human Trafficking, 60 UCLA L. REV. 76, 124 (2012).  
 193. The primary example Professor Pope offers is the Coalition of Immokalee Workers. Pope 
describes the CIW in these terms: “Instead of relying primarily on government enforcement, the CIW 
brings workers together, develops rights consciousness through education and action, and creates the 
space for workers to develop strategies for improving their conditions.” See Pope, supra note 166, at 
1863. 
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a narrow category of workplace harms, this paradigm could shift and expand 
with a broader conception of exploitation. 
Maybe the point of any defensible labor enforcement scheme is to 
empower workers to help themselves. Articulated in these terms, the 
fixation on how to leverage public support for labor enforcement programs 
distracts from a different, and arguably more urgent, information deficit: 
empowering the workers themselves and treating them as consumers of 
work-related information.194 Perhaps the problem isn’t that fostering 
consumer-oriented information disempowers workers, but rather that we 
have been fostering the wrong kind of information for the wrong set of 
consumers. Rebranding labor enforcement on these consumer protection 
terms would mean meeting workers where they are, which is isolated at the 
margins of the economy.195  
 
 
 194. As the DOL states: “We . . . understand that most workers are consumers (and vice versa), so 
our work sometimes yields benefits for the consumer public as well. . . . We want to let you know how 
the Labor Department can help you make safe and sound decisions as a consumer.” DOL Highlights 
National Consumer Protection Week, DEP’T OF LABOR BLOG (Mar. 8, 2012), http://blog.dol.gov/2012/ 
03/08/dol-highlights-national-consumer-protection-week/ [https://perma.cc/HWD8-89SW]. See also 
Phyllis Borzi, National Consumer Protection Week: Securing Your Health and Retirement Benefits, 
DEP’T OF LAB. BLOG (Mar. 8, 2012), http://blog.dol.gov/2012/03/08/national-consumer-protection-
week-securing-your-health-and-retirement-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/JF39-XSHU]. The justification 
for protecting workers is that those protections also benefit consumers. When OSHA targeted hair salon 
owners for importing formaldehyde-laden hair smoothing products for the popular “Brazilian blowout,” 
a key part of its messaging included the harms such products presented to consumers. See News Release, 
OSHA, DEP’T OF LABOR, U.S. Department of Labor Continues to Cite Beauty Salons and Manufacturers 
for Formaldehyde Exposure from Hair Smoothing Products (Dec. 8, 2011), 
https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=214
74 [https://perma.cc/JG4U-MH92] (noting that manufacturers and distributors of hair products were 
cited for “failing to protect their own workers from possible formaldehyde exposure as well as to 
communicate the hazards of formaldehyde exposure to salons, stylists and consumers.”). The FDA also 
issued a warning letter to a company distributing hair smoothing products, alleging a potential 
misbranding violation. Warning Letter from Michael W. Roosevelt, Acting Dir., Ctr. for Food Safety & 
Applied Nutrition of the U.S. Food & Drug Admin, to Mike Brady, CEO, Brazilian Blowout (Aug. 22, 
2011), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/ucm270809.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/258K-NX59]. California’s Department of Justice employed similar language when it 
announced a settlement agreement it reached with the manufacturer. See Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of 
Justice, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces Settlement Requiring Honest Advertising over 
Brazilian Blowout Products (Jan. 30. 2012), http://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-
kamala-d-harris-announces-settlement-requiring-honest [https://perma.cc/V3SH-EESU] (“California 
laws protect consumers and workers and give them fair notice about the health risks associated with the 
products they use . . . .”). 
 195. Often times, as immigrants, these workers exist beyond the reach of legal service provider 
networks. In other instances, they simply do not know their rights. See Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi 
Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1085–1089 
(2014). Given their tenuous status, cooks are in no position to inquire about rest breaks. And workplace 
norms often discourage busboys from seeking out promotion. See RUTH GOMBERG-MUÑOZ, LABOR AND 
LEGALITY: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF A MEXICAN IMMIGRANT NETWORK 92–94 (2011). 
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B. Equity 
Another problem stems from the heterogeneity of statuses within 
workplaces like restaurants. While all restaurant workers might share an 
interest in working in an environment free of sexual harassment or 
committed to safe working conditions, workers often diverge on the issue 
of pay. This is because restaurants are subject to antiquated labor laws 
grounded in tipping practices, which benefits servers but not cooks, hosts 
but not dishwashers. Thus, disputes centering on wage-related issues such 
as tipping can invite different degrees of support depending on one’s 
position on the restaurant staff.196  
To start with, federal labor laws guarantee that workers are paid a certain 
amount per hour but they do not guarantee from where that payment will 
come. Under FLSA, the federal minimum wage is $7.25, which means that 
all employees will get paid (at least in theory) that much an hour.197 FLSA 
separates out “tipped employees,” which it defines as those employees who 
traditionally and customarily receive tips. For those employees, FLSA 
imposes a $2.13 minimum wage requirement and allows employers to take 
a “tip credit” for the difference between that wage and the $7.25 baseline.198 
Put simply, federal laws allow employers like a restaurant owner to decide 
how it plans to ensure that her workers get paid at least $7.25 an hour. At 
the very least, that employer can pay a server as little $2.13 an hour so long 
as the tips the server receives amounts to at least $5.12 an hour (thereby 
reaching the $7.25 an hour federal minimum wage).  
This wage model allocates economic responsibility between two actors: 
employers and diners who support the restaurant. One consequence of this 
model is that it generates inequity within the restaurant staff, so that those 
who traditionally receive tips in the “front of the house” (such as servers, 
hosts, and bartenders) earn at a much higher rate than those who work in the 
“back of the house” (such as cooks, dishwashers, and busboys). In recent 
years, tipping policy has generated litigation199 and caused the public to 
reconsider the entire tipping system.200 This has been caused in part by 
 
 
 196. A similar dynamic operates in the organic and fair trade context, in which farmers tend to enjoy 
more privileged positions than farmworkers. Thus, forging ties with farmers allows employers to 
consolidate even more bargaining over their workers. See Daniel Jaffee et al., Bringing the “Moral 
Charge” Home: Fair Trade within the North and within the South, 69 RURAL SOC. 169, 171 (2004). 
 197. Wage theft remains a significant problem in many low-wage industries. See Stephen Lee, 
Policing Wage Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 655 (2014).  
 198. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 199. See Oregon Restaurant and Lodging Ass’n v. Perez, 816 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2016); Trejo v. 
Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc., 795 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 200. See Jonathan Kauffman, Tip pooling and the battle for equitable pay in restaurants, SF CHRON. 
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restaurants attempting to impose tip pooling or sharing policies as a way of 
ameliorating the pay disparity between the front and back of the house.  
Empowering consumers to monitor restaurants for labor and 
employment violations assumes to a certain extent that the employer-worker 
relationship is a contentious one or at least a relationship in which each side 
seeks to maximize monetary benefits. But it’s important to note that tipping 
policies foist onto workers the responsibilities of serving as agents to two 
principals: customers, who subsidize worker incomes with tips, and the 
employer, who pays the difference between tips and the minimum wage 
requirement.201 Within this world of having to serve two masters, tipping 
creates the possibility of collusion between consumers and workers.202 For 
example, a restaurant server may refill a customer’s drinks for free in the 
hopes of receiving a more generous tip. Effectuating an anti-exploitation 
agenda in this context reframe acts of collusion as acts of solidarity. From 
the consumer’s perspective, a more generous tip would not represent an 
expression of gratitude for the server’s willingness to cut the customer a 
deal on beverage service. Rather, it would be offered as help or support for 
the worker struggling to meet basic life needs within a low-wage industry.203  
At the same time, sharing enforcement responsibilities with the dining 
public threatens to exacerbate power dynamics that already animate the 
customer-server dynamic. Within the restaurant industry, a worker’s 
livelihood is already tied to consumers to the extent that the server relies on 
tips for income. This dependence already skews the consumer-worker 
relationship, and further empowering consumers in this sense might 
exacerbate the possibility of exploitation. In the parallel context of food 
safety inspection, which also increasingly relies on consumer input, 
Professor Daniel Ho noted that consumer-centric enforcement efforts invite 
problems of exacerbating discrimination within the inspection process. For 
example, food safety inspection programs are increasingly relying on 
consumer reviews through services like Yelp to help identify potentially 
incompliant restaurants. Such a strategy relies on choosing predictor terms 
that could point inspectors to the increased possibility of incompliance. 
 
 
March 25, 2016. 
 201. Michael Lynn & Shuo Wang, The Indirect Effects of Tipping Policies on Patronage Intentions 
Through Perceived Expensiveness, Fairness, and Quality, 39 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 62, 63 (2013).  
 202. Id.  
 203. See Michael Lynn, Service Gratuities and Tipping: A Motivational Framework, 46 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 74, 79–80 (2015) (noting that one potential motivation to tip is to help servers). See also 
Hainmueller & Hiscox, supra note 108, at 6–7, (noting that one possible motivation of consumers 
supporting improved working conditions for those creating goods for purchase is “deriv[ing] a ‘warm 
glow’ satisfaction from supporting a program that is helping workers”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/7
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Such choices are not often obvious, and as Professor Daniel Ho argues, have 
the potential to exacerbate racial and national origin discrimination: “for 
instance, if reviewers were more likely to call Asian restaurants ‘gross,’ 
conditional on the same inspection score, this result may reflect (anti-Asian) 
bias from consumers or (pro-Asian) bias from inspectors.”204 
C. Community Standing 
For many restaurant workers who are seen and not heard, the law creates 
the opportunity to assert and establish their belonging as members of their 
community. This vision of enforcement derives from the larger set of legal 
norms favoring integration of immigrants.205 Thus, any attempt to enlist 
consumers for help should foster the ability of food workers to affirm their 
standing. Low wages not only prevent many restaurant workers from 
climbing out of poverty, the institutional setting creates a work environment 
in which these workers move invisibly in the presence of others.206 
Restaurants in the United States employ roughly 1.4 million foreign-born 
individuals, but this figure understates the influence that unauthorized 
workers have on the industry and worker identity-formation.207 Indeed, 
many restaurateurs prefer unauthorized workers for their willingness to 
work long hours for little pay.208 This “positive” view of immigrant workers 
comes with its own restrictions. While unauthorized immigrants have a 
particularly strong presence in the “back of the house” as cooks and 
dishwashers,209 they stand very little chance of being promoted to the “front 
 
 
 204. See Daniel E. Ho, Equity in Bureaucracy, __ U.C. IRVINE L. REV. __ 1, 19 (forthcoming 2017).  
 205. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of What 
Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1 (2007).  
 206. Of course, this is a part of what separates great from merely good servers at restaurants. Then 
again, the treatment of servers at fining dining establishments is not a priority in terms of worker 
exploitation.  
 207. A significant body of sociological and anthropological work has shown how the restaurant 
industry welcomes immigrants and those with criminal records so long as they are willing to work 
beyond the public’s view. See RUTH GOMBERG-MUÑOZ, LABOR AND LEGALITY: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF 
A MEXICAN IMMIGRANT NETWORK (2011); Jong Bum Kwon, The Koreatown Immigrant Workers 
Alliance: Spatializing Justice in an Ethnic “Enclave”, in WORKING FOR JUSTICE: THE L.A. MODEL OF 
ORGANIZING AND ADVOCACY 23 (Milkman et al. eds., 2010); Alex Stepick et al., The View from the 
Back of the House: Restaurants and Hotels in Miami, in NEWCOMERS IN THE WORKPLACE: IMMIGRANTS 
AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE U.S. ECONOMY, 181, (Lamphere et al. eds., 1994); Victor Narro, 
Impacting Next Wave Organizing: Creative Campaign Strategies of the Los Angeles Worker Centers, 
50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 465 (2005).  
 208. See Kershaw, supra note 150. These employers sometimes use this preference to justify not 
hiring citizen workers, especially African Americans. See Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking 
Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1161 (2008).  
 209. See Gomberg-Munoz, supra note 189; Shannon Gleeson, Leveraging Health Capital at the 
Workplace: An Examination of Health Reporting Behavior Among Latino Immigrant Restaurant 
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of the house” as waiters or hosts and hostesses,210 highlighting 
subordinating elements of segregation: workers in the front can supplement 
their wages with tips while those in the back generally cannot.211 
Labor justice in restaurants and other domestic workplaces poses exactly 
the types of questions consumers can avoid by supporting other similar 
programs benefiting in foreign settings. Overseas programs like fair trade 
goods allow consumers to participate in reform projects from a distance. As 
labor and consumer historian Lawrence Glickman observes, the tradition of 
ethical consumption rests on a principle of “long distance solidarity” in 
which consumers can, through their purchases, support workers they don’t 
know or necessarily care about.212 This is perhaps one of the dilemmas 
presented by domestic labor justice campaigns. As Professor Dana Frank 
helpfully observes:  
Mobilizing consumer power on behalf of domestic workers . . . brings 
to the fore the messy question of cooperation with the U.S. labor 
movement. . . . Building domestic consumer-labor alliances 
. . . forces middle-class activists to confront domestic class 
differences, both in organizing and in consumption patterns, which 
are more easily elided or romanticized in overseas relationships.213  
Buying fair trade coffee to support indigenous Mayan farmers in Chiapas, 
Mexico214 avoids the difficult question of what we as American consumers 
owe to Chiapans who migrate to the United States and become our 
neighbors, a question that certainly arose when a Chiapan man died in the 
basement of a Detroit restaurant for which he worked without 
authorization215 and becomes relevant again when a Chiapan woman 
endures sexual harassment while picking fruit in Florida.216 These domestic 
examples force consumers to confront the uncomfortable moral question 
 
 
Workers in the United States, 75 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2291 (2012). 
 210. Ashar, supra note 8, at 1881. 
 211. Although not common, restaurants can implement tip-pooling policies. See Cumbie v. Woody 
Woo, Inc., 596 F.3d 577 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 212. See GLICKMAN, supra note 35. 
 213. Frank, supra note 114, at 376. 
 214. See Mexico “Chiapas” Coffee Roast, GROUNDS FOR CHANGE, HTTP://WWW.GROUNDS 
FORCHANGE.COM/SHOP/PRODUCT.PHP?PID=62.  
 215. See Serena Maria Daniels, Owners of Suburban Chinese Restaurant Charged After House Fire 
Killed 5 Immigrants, DETROIT METRO TIMES (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.metrotimes.com/table-and-
bar/archives/2016/02/12/owners-of-suburban-chinese-restaurant-charged-after-house-fire-killed-5-
immigrants.  
 216. See S. POVERTY LAW CTR., INJUSTICE ON OUR PLATES: IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN THE U.S. FOOD 
INDUSTRY 15-16 (2010), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/ 
publication/Injustice_on_Our_Plates.pdf.  
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underlying their attempts to engage in ethical behavior: do consumers owe 
a greater ethical obligation to those (like immigrants) who live and work in 
the same country and neighborhood or to workers toiling abroad (like fair 
trade farmworkers)? Legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron puts it this way: 
Much of our life is lived ‘on the road,’ or lived in circumstances 
where we are often and, in Kant’s phrase, ‘unavoidably side-by-side’ 
with strangers, with people alien to what we fancy are our traditions 
or our community. It may well be that a moral outlook that begins 
with the sheer fact of the proximity of two human beings—
irrespective of their affiliations—is a better bet for these 
circumstances than a moral outlook which takes as its starting point 
what we owe to those we know and to those with whom we already 
have a connection.217  
CONCLUSION 
In this article, I have attempted to identify places where existing food 
laws, regulatory structures, and norms can begin to address the pervasive 
problem of exploitation across the food system. Given food law’s interest 
in consumer empowerment, it is tempting to frame a discussion about 
exploitation in terms of what consumers will decide to embrace—about 
whether consumers will affirm fair working conditions or disavow 
exploitative and cruel labor practices. But an important point that I have 
tried to make is that the food law community’s reform agenda must allow 
for workers and their intermediaries to help set the terms of emerging 
markets for ethically-produced goods.  
Moving forward, workplace law scholars also have some work to do. 
Much of the recent turn by workplace advocates and scholars to the food 
law frame has proceeded in largely instrumental terms. But is there a “there” 
there? Workplace disputes that are conventional by many standards 
suddenly feel fresh because arguments are deployed in food law terms. 
Frames like “food security” arm labor unions with metrics for economic 
insecurity that the public can easily understand.218 While many middle-class 
 
 
 217. See Jeremy Waldron, Who is My Neighbor?:Humanity and Proximity, 86 THE MONIST 333, 
351 (2003). 
 218. For example, a recent study of University of California staff found that 70% of staff responded 
that they experienced “low” or “very low” food security. See Peter Drier et al, Food Insecurity Among 
University of California Employees, Urban & Environmental Policy Institute, 2016, at 
http://documents.latimes.com/UC-workers-food-insecurity/; Teresa Watanabe, Many UC workers 
struggle to feed themselves and their families, study shows, LA Times, Oct. 17, 2016. This “food 
security” framing formed a core part of its campaign. See CX Unit Strike, Teamsters 2010, at 
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citizens might struggle to envision what economic insecurity looks like, 
everyone can identify with being hungry. And labor enforcement agencies 
openly talk about the need to “leverage” the power of the sustainability 
framework to advance workplace safety goals.219 It may be that the only 
principle connecting food law’s ambitions to workplace law’s aspirations is 
the intuitive sense that it simply isn’t right that some people struggle to feed 
themselves while they dedicate their working hours to feeding others. But it 
seems a worthwhile endeavor to determine whether we can transform that 
intuition into something bigger and more enduring.
 
 
 
http://teamsters2010.org/?zone=/unionactive/view_page.cfm&page=CX20Strike20.  
 219. See Sustainability in the Workplace: A New Approach for Advancing Worker Safety and 
Health, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION AT 6 (Dec. 2016), https://www.osha. 
gov/sustainability/docs/OSHA_sustainability_paper.pdf. 
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